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Abstract
This  paper  presents  two conjectures  that  are  the product  of  the reconciliation  between modern
economics  and  the  long-standing  jurisprudential  tradition  originated  in  Ancient  Rome,  whose
influence is still pervasive in most of the world's legal systems.  We show how these conjectures
together with the theory that supports them can provide us with a powerful normative mean to solve
the  world's  most  challenging  problems  such  as  financial  crises,  poverty,  wars,  man-made
environmental  catastrophes  and  preventable  deaths.   The  core  of  our  theoretical  framework  is
represented by a class of imperfect information game built completely on primitives (self-interest,
human fallibility and human sociability) that we have called the Dominium Mundi Game (DMG) for
reasons that will become obvious.  Given the intrinsic difficulties that arise in solving this type of
models,  we  advocate  for  the  use  of  artificial  intelligence  as  a  potentially  feasible  method  to
determine the implications of the definitions and assumptions derived from the DMG's framework.
The world is giving signs that things are getting worse and not better.  After the global financial
crisis of 2008,  we have witnessed a series of adverse shocks such as the rise of national populism in
the most stable democracies, the fading of former alliances (eg., Brexit and the casted doubts on the
reliability of NATO), the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the pull-out of the United States
in both the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Deal, the threat of a full-blown trade war
between China and the USA, mass migration, especially in Europe and the sharp deterioration of
the peace process in the Middle East, including Jerusalem almost losing its 1947 international legal
status.  Even the moral rhetoric of the world is changing.  When faced with the murder of the Saudi
journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the U.S. President Donald Trump said “Any human rights concerns are
outweighed by U.S. national security and economic interests” (Herman, 2018).
Less  than  a  century  ago,  the  world  also  lived  a  series  of  adverse  shocks,  although with  more
dramatic intensity and consequences.  After the Great Depression, where millions of people lost
their jobs, it came the Nazi revolution, then World War II and finally proxy wars that spread out
through Latin America,  Africa and Asia.  But man-made adverse shocks with the unimaginable
misery  that  they  inflict  to  their  victims  are  not  a  creation  of  recent  history.   They  have  been
pervasive through the ages since the very beginning of civilization.  Many prosperous cultures have
been brought to an end because of adverse shocks and, even as bad as that, history has proved that,
under  certain  conditions,  it  might  take  centuries  to  replace  a  relative  advanced  culture  and its
associated material well-being with another equivalent alternative.  That was what happened with
the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the year 476 AD and the subsequent arrival of the Middle
Age (or Dark Ages).
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Given the above facts,  a reasonable question to  ask is  whether  or not  a  pattern for  man-made
adverse shocks can be elucidated.  From the perspective of science, it would be even better to find a
causal relationship that will help us to understand not only why these phenomena happen, but also
what can be done in order to prevent their emergence.  Economics, as the science of scarce means
and competing ends (see Boulding, 1966 and cf. Becker, 1976), is particularly suited to deal with
the topic of man-made adverse shocks so that we can find scientific answers to the above questions.
With this  purpose in mind,  we pursue the following path.   In  Section 1,  we address the main
obstacles that have hindered economics in making significant contributions in this area.  In Section
2, we present the primitives of our theoretical framework based on self-interest, human fallibility
and human sociability and provide the empirical justification regarding the need of such primitives.
In Section 3, we not only cover the main technical aspects of the Dominium Mundi Game (DMG)
framework (eg., the DMG's Fundamental Inequality and First Conjecture), but also deal with the
methodological challenges posed by our game-theoretic approach.  We make the case for the use of
artificial intelligence as a potentially feasible mean to solve imperfect information games relevant to
economics and the Law.  In Section 4, we evaluate some empirical evidences to determine the
significance of our approach to today's real-world problems and its effectiveness for policy and
legal aims.  Here we formulate the DMG's Second Conjecture and provide our final considerations.
1. From Adam Smith's Invisible Hand to Francisco de Vitoria's Visible Hand.
The key to solve the puzzle in man-made adverse shocks lies in the conjecture posed by Adam
Smith's invisible hand (1759 and 1776).  Unfortunately, Adam Smith's conjecture is not easy to
understand.  As historian Peter Harrison (2011, p. 29) wrote: “Few phrases in the history of ideas
have attracted as much attention as Smith’s ‘invisible hand,’ and there is a large body of secondary
literature devoted to it.  In spite of this there is no consensus on what Smith might have intended
when he used this expression, or on what role it played in Smith's thought.”  Economists have
traditionally interpreted Adam Smith's invisible hand as “In competition, individual ambition serves
the  common good.”   In  this  context,  economists  mean  by competition,  perfect  competition  or
competitive  equilibrium,  and  by  common  good,  Pareto  efficient  allocation.   In  this  regard,
Samuelson (1989, p. 825), a key advocate of the above view stated: "Smith was unable to prove the
essence of his invisible-hand doctrine. Indeed, until the 1940s, no one knew how to prove, even to
state properly, the kernel of truth in this proposition about perfectly competitive market." 
Even critics  to mainstream economics like Nobel  Prize-winning Joseph Stiglitz  asserts  that  the
Invisible Hand leads to Pareto Optimum or welfare maximization (forthcoming).  He even affirmed
that “Adam Smith's invisible hand may be invisible because, like the Emperor's new clothes, it
simply isn't there; or if it is there, it is too palsied to be relied upon” (Stiglitz, 1991, p. 5).  The
problem with the economists' interpretation of Adam Smith's conjecture is that simply ignores the
basic rules of interpretation, which were formulated by Friedrich Savigny in 1840: grammatical
(literal), historical, systematic and teleological (purpose) interpretation (see Savigny, 1840).  Adam
Smith never talked about perfect competition not even suggested the conditions or criteria, which
would guarantee the emergence of perfect competition.  He only limited himself to the case when
an  individual,  institution  or  trading  company  was  granted  a  monopoly  or  special  right  by  the
government.  He suggested that in the absence of such privileges enforced by the government, greed
would be able to find its way to lead society to the common good.  The same Stiglitz proved that
this  lax  conception  of  a  market-based  economy  is  neither  a  sufficient  condition  to  guarantee
competitive equilibrium nor it leads the economy to a Pareto Optimum.  Based on his previous
work (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988 -as well as other papers: Scitovsky, 1950; Arrow 1958;
Stiglitz, 1989; Salop, 1979 and Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988), Stiglitz (1991, p. 16) affirms that “in
general, when risk markets are incomplete and information is imperfect, markets are not constrained
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Pareto optimal:  the Invisible Hand does not work.”  This statement is  consistent with Stiglitz's
(forthcoming, p. 1) insightful observation that competitive equilibrium as proved by Arrow (1951)
and Debreu (1954), “only held under very restrictive conditions, not satisfied in any real world
economy.”  Stiglitz (1991, p. 17) claims that not only “imperfect information is pervasive in the
economy” but also “risk markets are far from complete”. He states that “many of the important risks
which we face are uninsurable.”
The irony of the history of economic thought is that what economists mean by invisible hand is
nothing else that the visible hand of the Law.  Economists claim that the proof of their particular
interpretation  of  Adam Smith's  invisible  hand,  which  was  done  by  Arrow  (1951)  and  Debreu
(1954), is one of the greatest intellectual achievement of economics because not only establishes a
link between optimality and decentralized equilibria, but also shows that competitive equilibrium
allocations maximize the aggregate welfare of society.  Therefore, according to this logic, Adam
Smith, one of the key figures of the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment,  must be considered the
father  of  modern  economics.   But  as  we  saw earlier,  Adam Smith's  invisible  hand  cannot  be
interpreted as competitive equilibrium.  In fact, the very concept of competitive equilibrium was
brought to life at least two centuries before Adam Smith by Francisco de Vitoria, a Spanish jurist
and Chair of theology at the University of Salamanca, who is considered the father of International
Law given his reasoning regarding the legal status and corresponding rights of the native people
who, according to Vitoria, form part of a  communitas totius orbis  (an international community),
which seeks an universal common good (see Vitoria, 1539 and Cendejas, 2018).   
Contrary to Adam Smith's almost unrestricted competition concept, Francisco de Vitoria was very
clear and specific in what constitutes a competitive equilibrium.  Cendejas (2018, p. 9) summarized
the essence of Vitoria's thought in the following terms: “For Vitoria, fairness in exchanges does not
result from mere consent, but conditions that allow us to speak of a fully voluntary act must be
verified; absence of fraud and deceit, which cause ignorance, and that the seller or the buyer do not
take advantage of the situation of need on the other side of the market.  These are the fundamental
prerequisites  of  a  lawful  purchase  and  the  basis  of  the  just  price  formed  from  the  common
estimate...The profit is lawful if it results from buying and selling at just prices.”  What Vitoria
means  for  common  estimate  is  nothing  else  than  the  estimation  determined  by  the  market.
Excluding the cases of fraud and malice, Vitoria stated (1536a, q. LXXVII, art. 1.) that in order to
buy and sell according to justice, we should consider only the price that a product is sold commonly
in the market, and not its costs and labor.  Thus, Vitoria's economic view formulated in the 16 th
century is equivalent to the economists' understanding of competitive equilibrium.  Due to this fact,
Francisco de Vitoria should be considered the true father of modern economics.  But Vitoria (1536a,
q. LXXVII, art. 1.) went even further in his analysis, suggesting that when there are few buyers and
sellers in the market, for example, when wheat during times of hunger is in the hands of one or so
few, the fair  price is not equal to the market price and, therefore,  Conrado's  (1500) reasonable
conditions and considerations should be applied -expenses, labor, risk and scarcity must be taken
into account to determine the fair price.  
In Francisco de Vitoria we can see the enormous influence that the Roman jurisprudence had in his
economic thought, especially in the topic of voluntary agreement and unfair enrichment, which is
summarized by the Latin maxim “nemo locupletari debet cum aliena iactura”, meaning no one
should be benefited at another's expense (see Pomponius, Digest 12.6.14).  For Vitoria, a fair market
price  was  not  the  necessary  byproduct  of  an  invisible  hand  or  the  natural  and  unavoidable
consequence of market forces.   Vitoria understood that markets don't work in a vacuum.  As a
Catholic theologist  and jurist,  he also understood that greed,  the ruthless maximization of self-
interest,  is insatiable and knows no bounds. He understood that for a market to meet its above
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jurisprudential  criteria;  that is  to say,  that for a market to be really competitive,  without fraud,
market  manipulation  and malice,  the  Law (ius) should  be  already  firmly  established  (Victoria,
1536b, c.58,  a.1).   Vitoria's  judgment comes from a long-standing tradition,  traced back to  the
Roman  jurist  Ulpian  who  stated:  “Iustitia  est  constans  et  perpetua  voluntas  ius  suum  cuique
tribuendi.” (Digest 1.1.10pr), which means “Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to
every man his due” (Wikiquote, 2018).  In other words, the Law (ius) does not come spontaneously
or by chance, it must be consciously and actively sought.  It is important to notice that “ius” and law
are not necessarily the same thing.  The Latin genitive “iuris, ius” means right.  The word law
instead it is the Latin equivalent of the word “lex”. The difference between “ius” and “lex” is that
the former is built from the reasoning of particular cases and the incisive observation of the natural
order as was practiced by the Roman jurists, while the latter are norms established by convention or
mandate.  The Roman jurist Celsus defined Law (ius) as  “ars boni et aequi,” in other words, the
Law is the art of goodness and equity. Its fundamental purpose is to to protect the weak against the
abuse by the strong (Ayala, 1789, p.6).  It is from the fair solution to a case where the rule arises and
not from the authority of the prince, parliament, city council or the supreme court.  For the Romans,
the work of the jurists were more important than legal norms (Blanch  Nougués, 2013).  Another
way  to  grasp  this  subtle  difference  is  through  the  following  Latin  maxim,  which  implicitly
recognizes that “ius” and “lex” are not always equivalent: “Lex iniusta non est lex” - an unjust law
is  not  law.   In  addition,  it  is  worth noting that  a  jurisprudential  approach to  economics  is  not
equivalent to “law and economics” or the economic analysis of law. This latter approach, which
doesn´t follow any long-standing tradition, was developed mostly by scholars of the Chicago school
of economics, which is a private institution, characterized by a libertarian and neoclassical school of
economic thought.
For the Roman jurists, justice was not invisible, on the contrary, it was represented by a blindfold, a
balance and a sword.  Using Adam Smith's allegory, the Law is a visible hand.  This is so because
competitive equilibrium is, as Vitoria suggested, the result of the proper application of the Law.  It
belongs to the realm of normative economics – what ought to be – and not to the realm of positive
economics -what really is.  Unfortunately, mainstream economists go the other way around.  They
claim that competitive equilibrium is the right model to describe how the economy works  (see
Stokey and Lucas with Prescott, 1989).  In their mind, there is no difference between positive and
normative economics, issues of political economy do not arise, all economic agents, including both
the government and the central bank, behave in the way they are expected to do, thus if something
ever  goes  wrong,  it  is  nobody's  fault  (eg.,  market  frictions,  external  shocks,  etc.).   As  a
consequence,  their  models  are  implicitly  designed  to  be  what  it  could  be  called  a  “politically
correct” model.  Following Lucas critique (1976) on large-scale macroeconometric models, central
banks use now dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for forecasting and policy
analysis.  DSGE models combine microeconomic analysis of agents' behavior with an estimation
approach using macroeconomic variables. When there is a need of a more detailed financial sector,
the European Central Bank (ECB) uses the Christiano, Motto and Rostagno model (Smets, et al.,
2010).  This  model  assumes a competitive market  in  the banking sector  (Christiano,  Motto and
Rostagno,  2010).  Similarly,  the  DSGE model  used  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  New York
(FRBNY) shares the same assumption. They impose a zero profit condition to the banking sector
(Del Negro, Marco et al., 2013).  Following this common trust in the market, both DSGE models
enforce another zero profit condition in the final good producers, who assemble intermediate goods.
It is worth noting that these final good producers are basically traders or businessmen who buy
intermediate  goods,  aggregate  them  and  sell  them  as  final  goods.   There  is  no  technological
progress or innovation in this sector. Therefore, taking into consideration both the banking sector
and  final  good  producers,  the  central  banks  with  their  DSGE  model  are  saying  that  today's
merchants  operate  in  a  competitive  market  and  earn  zero  economic  profit.   This  assumption,
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however, is in sharp contrast with what we observe in reality.  Just to name one example, Anderson
and Creswell (2007) affirmed: “Combined, the top 25 hedge fund managers last year earned $14
billion -enough to pay New York City’s 80,000 public school teachers for nearly three years.”   
As we could reasonable anticipate from any idealization of reality or a “political correct” model,
DSGE macroeconomics not only failed to predict the 2008 financial crisis, but also did not provide
any convincing explanation about the causes and best responses to avoid future crisis.  As Gatti,
Gaffeo and Gallegate (2010, p. 112) stated: “But those models support the idea that markets—albeit
recurrently  buffeted  by  random  disturbances—are  inherently  stable  and  that  all  uncertainty  is
exogenous and additive, two statements which have been treated as principles of faith instead of
being rigorously demonstrated.” Clarifying this issue, Stiglitz  (2018, p. 78-79 and 76) makes two
relevant statements:  First, that the financial crisis of 2008 was not caused by an exogenous shock
like  bad weather,  a  plague or  an epidemic,  but  rather  “by the breaking of  the housing bubble
-something that markets created, and to which misguided policy may have contributed...see, for
example, Bernanke (2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009), Sowell (2009), and Mian and Sufi
(2015).”  Second, that DSGE models “effectively said that it [the 2008 financial crisis] couldn't
happen.  Under the core hypotheses (rational expectation, exogenous shocks), a crisis of that form
and magnitude simply couldn't occur.”
From our discussion of Francisco de Vitoria's visible hand, the theoretical findings of Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1986, 1988), etc., and the new evidences brought to light by the 2008 financial crisis
(Stiglitz, 2018 and forthcoming; FCIC, 2011; Webel, 2013; Mehrling, 2016; Hou and Skeie, 2014
and Nelson, et. al., 2017), it is clear that any reasonable model of the economy can not be built on
the simplifying assumption of competitive equilibrium or zero-economic profits.   Ironically, Adam
Smith's conjecture of the invisible hand, properly formulated, is a good starting point for building
an alternative theoretical framework. We need to ask ourselves, where greed will take us when the
only condition imposed to the economy is the absence of monopolies or special rights granted to
individuals or companies by an independent government.  Answering this question is the essence of
this work.  We claim that Adam Smith's conjecture will lead us to the  Dominium Mundi Game.
Let's see why this is so.
2. The Dominium Mundi Game's Primitives and their Empirical Justification
Figure 1 illustrates in a single decision tree the basic structure of the DMG´s theoretical framework.
As it can be seen, instead of assuming an idealized form of government, the sanctity of the central
bank, zero-economic profits or competitive equilibrium, we propose a new paradigm built entirely
on primitives such as self-interest,  human fallibility and human sociability.   This approach will
allow us to develop a theoretical model not only to explain the primary causes of man-made adverse
shocks, but also to determine the full implications of Adam Smith's invisible hand as interpreted and
formulated in the previous section.  In Section 4, we see how the insights provided by this approach
can be used for normative purposes.
The first primitive of our model is self-interest.  Self-interest is a very powerful driver of human
behavior. Even Thomas Aquinas, the medieval Doctor of the Church, recognizes that people are
more solicitous on their own affairs than on common things (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Secunda
Secundae, c. 66, a.2, see also Cendejas, 2018).  The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
are based on the premise that each individual pursues his or her own self interest.  However, the
Dominium Mundi Game (DMG) approach makes a distinction between self-interest and greed.  For
us, self-interest is an integral part of human nature, even necessary to ensure survival while greed is,
on the other hand, the ruthless maximization of self-interest, and therefore, they are not necessarily
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equivalent terms.  Greed is rather an innate concept in economics.  Economists generally assume
that people behave as if they made utility maximization calculations (Friedman, 1953).  Regarding
its  use  in  economic  analysis,  Gary  Becker  (1976,  p.  5)  wrote:  “Everyone  recognize  that  the
economic  approach  assumes  maximizing  behavior  more  explicitly  and  extensively  than  other
approaches do, be it the utility or wealth function of the household, firm, union, or government
bureau that is maximized.”  For the case of a government or a central bank, the concept of greed can
pose a challenging problem.  What does the government or the central bank exactly maximize?  As
we  pointed  out  in  the  previous  section,  economists  prefer  to  build  “politically  correct”
macroeconomic models where the political authorities are selfless and pursue always the common
good.  Is not that contradictory? For example, Lucas and Stokey (1983) treated the government as
another agent. They stated “...we take the objective of government to be to maximize consumer
welfare...”  (1983,  p.  62).  They  justified  this  convenient  but  dangerous  assumption  observing
“...Ramsey 1927 sought to characterize the excise tax pattern(s) that would maximize the utility of
the consumer (or minimize the ‘excess burden’ or ‘welfare cost’ of taxation). He thus abstracted
from  distributional  questions  and  from  issues  of  possible  conflict  between  the  objectives  of
‘government’ and those governed, abstractions that will be maintained in this paper, as they were in
those  cited  below”  (1983,  p.  55-56).   But  can  Ramsey´s  approach  be  generalized  to  all
macroeconomic  problems?   The  DMG  framework,  in  contrast  to  the  neoclassical  approach,
incorporates both self-interest and greed in modeling the political process.
Figure 1. The Dominium Mundi Game Framework*
Note* :The Dominium Mundi Game framework follows the aqua color path.
Note** :Human Fallibility includes both bounded rationality and cognitive bias.
The second primitive in the DMG is human fallibility; that is to say, the recognition of the self-
evident  fact  that  people do not  possess perfect  rationality.   Human fallibility  encompasses  two
characteristics:   “bounded  rationality”  (Simon,  1955)  and  cognitive  bias  (Thaler,  2000)–  one
popular experiment on this topic is the “invisible gorilla test” carried out by Simons and Chabris
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(1999).   As a  consequence  of  both impediments  to  rationality,  individuals  not  only may adopt
heuristics or “rules of thumb” when making decisions, but also they may create their own subjective
reality when trying to understand certain things from the environment that surrounds them.  Given
that human fallibility coexists with rationality,  the key theoretical question is to determine when to
assume rationality and when to assume human fallibility. 
In building a DMG model, we need to make assumptions about how agents process information and
forecast future events.  The easiest way to go would be to assume rational expectations, where all
agents  share  the  same model  of  the  world,  that  is  to  say,  they  all  share  the  same probability
distribution (Sargent, 2016).  The main technical advantage of rational expectation is that allows, as
Sargent (2016) pointed out, “a ruthless dimension reduction”.   For practical reasons, we want to
deviate as little as possible from this simplifying assumption.   However, because of the nature of
our topic and in order to be consistent with the empirical evidence, we are compelled to take a
somehow different approach.  We assume that agents may hold biased beliefs,  especially when
faced with conflict of interest (Moore et al., 2010; Ariely, 2012; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004;
Murata  et.  al.,  2015;  Graber,  1984;  Bartlett,  1932;  Lord et  al.,  1979;  Zaller,  1992;  Rabin and
Schrag, 1999 and Klayman, 1995).  It is worth mentioning that the assumption of biased belief in
the face of conflict of interest is consistent with the jurisprudential principle: “nemo iudex in causa
sua,” which means “no-one should be a judge in his own case” (wikipedia, 2018).  In addition,
consistent  with  this  behavioral  model,  we  also  assume  that  newspapers  (or  the  provider  of
information)  can  slant  stories  toward  these  biased  beliefs  (Mullainathan  and  Shleifer,  2005;
Goldberg, 2002; Coulter 2003; Alterman, 2003; Franken, 2003; Baron, 2004; Besley and Prat, 2006;
Djankov et al., 2003; Jensen, 1979, Hamilton, 2003).  This assumption is not a surprise because
historically newspapers were affiliated with political parties (Hamilton, 2003 and Gentzkow et. al.,
2015).
The  above  two assumptions  provide  the  DMG framework  with  a  powerful  mean  to  introduce
irrationality into an otherwise rational economic model.  Together with the other two elements of
human nature (self-interest and human sociability), human fallibility can give rise not only to hard-
to-explain social phenomena such as ideology, religious fanaticism and legal corruption but also to
the compulsive nature of greed, which knows no limit.  So when an economic agent faces a strong
conflict of interest, rationality can not tame greed, cognitive bias comes in and affects the way in
which that agent processes information.  As John Acton (1887) once wrote: “Power tends to corrupt,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”  Ironically, in Aristotle (384-322 BC), the father of logic,
we can find a clear example of how rationality can be profoundly distorted by conflict of interest,
even in exceptionally gifted minds. In his apology to the institution of slavery, Aristotele affirmed
that slavery was even good for the slave. He suggested that natural slaves lack the ability to think
properly, so they need to have masters to tell them what to do (Aristotle, Politics). The problem with
his logic is that it goes against the Law, against the most fundamental rights of the people.  In the
Roman law, slavery was never justified by the ius civile but taken instead from the ius gentium as an
international convention.   Slavery is considered nowadays a  ius cogens violation (1926 Slavery
Convention and 1969 Vienna Convention). 
Given that Adam Smith never meant perfect competition (or competitive equilibrium), a relevant
question to ask about his invisible-hand conjecture is if it can also be viewed as an apology but, in
this case, for the rich or the merchant elite.  As we will see, the answer to this question will provide
us with further insights about the nature of the Dominium Mundi Game.  In the Theory of Moral
Sentiment (1759, p. 350), Smith wrote “They [the rich] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly
the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have made, had the earth been divided
into equal proportions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it,
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advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.  When
Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who
seemed to have been left out in the partition.” It seems that with the moral philosopher Adam Smith
the merchant elite as a social group could finally reach a moral status similar to the one enjoyed by
the nobility and the high clergy, a justification of their privileges by some kind of odd “divine right”
or Dei gratia.  This was an extraordinary accomplishment, which will prove to be very relevant to
the DMG framework.  It was the culmination of centuries of struggle between the merchant princes
and those who opposed them.  The power of the rising merchant elite became obvious in the 17 th
century by a series of events that ended up leading to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which
overthrew King James II of England.  Two of these key events were the foundation of the Dutch
East India Company in 1602 and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Eighty and
Thirty Years’ Wars and replaced the medieval European system centered around the figure of the
Pope and the  Holy  Roman Emperor  by  an international  system based on sovereign  states  and
national self-interest.  It is worth noting that the rise of a secular world order after the Peace of
Westphalia was the consequence of the Thirty Years' “religious” war, which was one of the most
deadly armed conflicts that took place before the 20th century, killing, for example, around a quarter
of  all  germans (Wilson,  2010).   Paradoxically  catholic  France,  a  key player  in  that  war,  sided
against the catholic coalition.  Not surprisingly, France was led by a king whose father was a former
Huguenot  who fought  himself  against  the  Catholic  League of  France  (Wikipedia,  2018).   The
Dominium Mundi Game will make clear why “no one can serve two masters” (Mt. 6:24).
In the Middle Age, there were also clear evidence of power struggles of the kind suggested above.
The rivalry between the Guelphs and Ghibellines in Italy, where the Lombard League defended the
liberties  of  their  city-states  against  the  centralization  of  power  promoted  by  the  holy  Roman
emperors.  In fact, the name Dominium Mundi (“world dominium” or world domination) became
popular because of that conflict, which also involved the popes who, paradoxically, sided against
the holy Roman emperors, their  supposed natural allies.   During the 14 th century the economic
powerhouse of Europe was concentrated in the northern part of Italy (Bairoch et. al., 1988) and their
cities  were  controlled  by  wealthy  mercantile  families  (see  De Long and Shleifer,  1993).   The
spectacular  and mysterious  rise  of  the  Medici,  the  family  who founded the  Medici  Bank,  is  a
canonical example.  Among their members were the rulers of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, two
queens regent of France and three popes.  However, It its worth mentioning that the dominion of
some city-states by merchant oligarchies in Medieval Europe was not a new phenomenon.  The
Prophet Isaiah, who according to the Jewish Virtual Library, lived between c. 740 and 681 BC and
probably belonged to the Jerusalem aristocracy, stated: “Who hath taken this counsel against Tyre,
the  crowning  city,  whose  merchants  are  princes,  whose  traffickers  are  the  honourable  of  the
earth?” (Isaiah, 23:8). Isaiah’s words are consistent with the historical and archaeological records
found in ancient Levant and the Mediterranean region (Nigro, 2018; Röllig, 1983; Glenn, 2000;
Katz, 2008; Ordóñez Fernández, 2011; Izquierdo-Egea, 2014; Crawley Quinn and Vella, 2014). 
In  spite  of  the  above  facts,  many  things  still  remain  unclear,  especially  the  question  of  how
merchants became so rich and powerful.  What is the underlying cause of their fabulous wealth
throughout the history of civilization?  The granting of monopolies or special rights as the most
important driver of excess returns, as suggested by Adam Smith for the 18 th century, seems to be a
consequence  rather  than  a  cause.   That  is  to  say,  the  merchant  elite  obtained  those  privileges
because they were already powerful.  Which king or parliament in the 17th and 18th centuries would
grant  an  enviable  monopoly  to  a  nobody?  In  reality,  of  course,  it  could  also  be  more  like  an
interactive process or a positive feedback loop, where a rise in economic wealth is translated into a
rise in political power, which in turn creates more economic rents (Pagano and Volpin, 2005).  In
this  regards,  Stiglitz  (2018, p.  76 and 93) provides a  good starting point for understanding the
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underlying reasons of this mysterious phenomenon.   He notices not only that “the presence of
imperfect and asymmetric information leads to credit and equity rationing”, but also that imperfect
capital markets “result in banks playing a central role”.  But what is really behind the business of
banking or,  in general,  in any large-scale operation of buying and selling? What role plays the
merchant elite? The same Stiglitz (forthcoming) stated that financial  structure matters but he is
rather vague on this topic.  Does he means a network structure or merely heterogeneous agents
(Stiglitz,  2018)?   In  spite  of  his  ambiguity,  he  also  mentions  something worth  of  considering.
Stiglitz (2017, p. 6) affirmed “the functioning of markets also depends on trust.  No economy can
rely on the enforcement of contracts through the legal system.”  So where does this puzzling trust
come from?  This  gap  in  the  current  macroeconomic  literature provides  us  with the necessary
justification  to  introduce  a  third  assumption  regarding human nature:  human sociability,  which
means, as Aristotle (384-322 BC) brilliantly expressed in his work Politics: “Man is by nature a
social animal”.
Historically, the two institutions that consistently have provided the strongest bond (or trust) for
social life are family and religion.  Family is a natural institution.  It is an integral part of our
humanity and has  been present  at  least  since the beginning of human prehistory (Van Arsdale,
2015).  Religion, on the other hand,  is more elusive regarding its origin.  However, the etymology
of the word religion can shed some light on its true meaning.  It derives from the Latin words “re”
and “ligare” and, therefore, its meaning is related to the word tie or bond (Helena, 2018).  So, for
our purpose, any system of beliefs that result in a strong tie or bond among people as if they were a
family is a religion. Ironically, the followers of Karl Marx (1843), who claimed that “religion is the
opium of the people,” ended up creating their own religion in the form of Marxism-Leninism and
the Stalin's cult of personality.  Politics, family, religion and the economy are intimately related.
For example, in time of Augustus (27 BC-14 AD), the title of pontifex maximus (the greatest priest
or “pope”) and the imperial office were subsumed under the same person.  In the ancient world, the
temples played a central  role in the economies  of the Mediterranean.  In his  work on General
Economic History (1923), Max Weber tells that at the beginning temples served as deposit boxes,
since  gods  were  considered  sacred  and  those  who  laid  their  hands  on  it  committed  sacrilege.
Subsequently, they became lenders for both merchants and princes.    
For our purpose, however, the most relevant example of the complex interrelation between markets
and religion is offered by the ancient Phoenicians, who developed one of the most enduring culture
in human history, which lasted from c. 2,500 BC (see Bentley and Ziegler, 2000 and Nigro, 2007) to
146 BC before the fall of Carthage.  What insights can we learn from the greatest merchants of
antiquity, the “bestower of crowns” as the Prophet Isaiah called them (Is, 23:8)?  The Mediterranean
Sea  before  being  named  mare  nostrum (our  sea)  by  the  Romans  was  in  fact  the  sea  of  the
Phoenicians.  Among Phoenician cities, Tyre was the one that perfected the art of commerce at
levels unprecedented in the history of mankind. Its  tentacles reached until  the other end of the
Mediterranean in the Iberian Peninsula (Ordóñez Fernández, 2011; Izquierdo-Egea, 2014; Aubet,
2001 and Ratzinger, 2012).  The Phoenicians founded the city of Carthage, whose general Hannibal
Barca left Rome on the verge of destruction.  According to Lorenzo Nigro (2018), the Phoenicians
didn't have a country.  They “belonged to each single harbor city of the Levant.”  He stated that
even though their communities were able to hybridize with other people from the Mediterranean,
they wanted to keep something unique about themselves, a cultural identity that would set them
apart from everybody else.  They achieved that through their own bizarre religion, which seems to
have included, among other things, human sacrifices, especially from their own children in what
was known as the rite of the Tophet (Nigro, 2018).  Another important aspect of the Phoenician
religion was the observation and interpretation of stars, useful for navigation (Nigro, 2018).  These
activities were carried out inside the sacred installations of their temples.  As it is to be expected,
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these  practices were kept secret from outsiders -at least in Motya, Sicily- through high walls that
surrounded both the temple and the city (Nigro, 2018).
Given  the  scale  of  their  trading  networks  (Puckett,  2012;  Nigro,  2018;  Katz,  2008;  Ordóñez
Fernández, 2011; Izquierdo-Egea, 2014 and Crawley Quinn and Vella, 2014), the Phoenician could
be considered the father of unfettered market-based economy and, therefore,  their  legacy could
provide us with many useful insights for modeling purpose.  As the Phonecians proved, the market
is an institution, but rather a very complex one.  In essence, for them, markets were hierarchical
trading networks where information flowed in an asymmetric way.  In other words, a kind of cosa
nostra (“our thing”). It would be reasonable to assume, without prejudice of any official title, that at
the top of the Phoenician hierarchy was the merchant prince from the dominant harbor city (eg.,
Tyre or Carthage), followed by the merchant princes from other harbor cities (eg., Motya, Sicily or
Gadir, Spain) – maybe, as in the case of the nobility, the merchant princes were related by blood or
by bonds of marriage,- the next group would come from wealthy merchant families who belonged
to the Phoenician inner circle, that is to say, those families who took an active role in the Phoenician
rituals.   Finally, the last key group of their communities could have been composed of other less
affluent Phoenician merchants or even outsiders who had some kind of link or tie (including those
by virtue of marriage) with the Phoenician.   A market structure dominated by such a powerful
network would be very difficult to challenge.  When a key Phoenician harbor city fell (eg., The
Siege of Tyre by Alexander the Great in 332 BC), another Phoenician harbor city took the lead (eg.
Carthage).   Adam Smith seems to have missed the possibility that a market-based economy could
be organized as a hierarchical trading network.  
We shall not underestimate the real power of a hierarchical trading network like the one created by
the Phoenicians.  History seems to suggest that the only way to bring down a network like that is by
taking control of every single harbor city that belongs to that network.   The Romans achieved
precisely this after defeating the Phoenicians in the Punic wars.  But that was not enough.  There
were also other powers in the Mediterranean (eg. the Hellenistic leagues and kingdoms), which
undermined Roma's position.   Roma's response was to conquer all of them until it had total control
over the whole Mediterranean Basin.  This was a truly remarkable achievement in human history
known as the  Pax Romana or  Pax Augusti  in honor to Caesar Augustus.  The  Ara Pacis Augusti
(“Altar of  Augustan Peace”) commissioned by the Roman Senate to honor Augustus is a testimony
of the significance of this event.  There was a hope of a new world order characterized by Rome's
universal peace.   According to Joseph Ratzinger (2012, p. 60), “In the inscription at  Priene, he
[Augustus] is called Saviour, Redeemer (sōtēr [a title of gods even ascribed to Zeus]).”  Ratzinger
adds, “Peace, above all, was what the ‘Saviour’ brought to the world.”  According to Reiser (2003
p.  458*),  Augustus  brought  “peace,  security  of  law and prosperity  for  250 years,  which  many
countries of the former Roman Empire can only dream of today.”  But as Ratzinger (2012) notices,
the Pax Augusti, even at the height of the Roman empire, was never completely realized.  It did not
endure.  Why?  As we said earlier, the Romans -even after their rise to power- had divided their
legal  order  basically  in  two main  systems:  ius  civile,  which was  a  rational  and jurisprudential
system applied to Roman citizens, and ius gentium, which was a sort of customary rules adopted by
convention, reflecting international practices of nations but without having necessarily an  opinio
juris sive necessitatis (“an opinion of law or necessity”).  This particular type of Roman ius gentium
was the legacy of the oppressive systems that prevailed in the ancient Mediterranean, where part of
humanity were treated as another tradeable commodity and where elements of law and the apology
of power coexisted.  The institution of slavery was part of that legacy and the ius gentium provided
the Romans with the opportunity to profit from their inmense power.   In other words, the  Pax
Augusti was not a peace based on justice.  As it will become clear, the Romans also played the
Dominum Mundi Game. The world had to wait  until  Francisco de Vitoria's (1539)  communitas
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totius orbis and its corresponding universal common good to see the transformation of the old ius
gentium into a truly international law.
Continuing our discussion on networks, game theory can provide us with some insights regarding
issues of identification and affiliation.  Rick Riolo (1997) showed that arbitrary tags -in his case
random number between zero and one-  assigned to artificial agents could become an effective way
to  organize  social  interactions.    By forming cooperative  neighborhoods around common tags,
Riolo's  agents  achieved levels  of  cooperation  that  were impossible  when contacts  were merely
random.  Given the above facts and arguments, the Dominium Mundi Game framework is based on
networks  as  an  alternative  to  some  kind  of  exogenous  heterogeneous  agents.  In  contrast  to
neoclassical economics, which assumes that goods are traded on a centralized Walrasian exchange,
where  buyers  and  sellers  are  anonymous,  we  assume  that  markets  are  decentralized  and  their
participants  must  share  a  relationship  or  link  to  engage in  exchange.   The economic  literature
provides a variety of reasons to explain the emergence of networks as a key component of any
market structure. Kranton and Minehart (2001, p. 486) offer two reasons, one economic, the other
strategic.  “First,  networks  can  allow  buyers  and  sellers  collectively  to  pool  uncertainty  in
demand...When sellers have links to more buyers, they are insulated from the difficulties facing any
one buyer. And when buyers purchase from the same set of sellers, there is a saving in overall
investment costs. As for the strategic motivation, multiple links can enhance an agent's competitive
position. With access to more sources of supply (demand), a buyer (seller) secures better term of
trade.” Gale and Kariv (2007) point out that asymmetric information may imply that merchants will
trade only with others they know and trust. They also cite transaction costs and increasing returns as
motives for network formation.  Babus (2016) asserts that a network allows losses to be shared
among all counterparties of a failed institution. Gofman (2017) asseverates that the efficiency of
trading and liquidity allocation decrease as a banking network faces limits on its interconnectedness
because its intermediation chains become longer. 
Our assumption of viewing the market as an institution composed of networks, it is supported by
the empirical evidence.  Soramäki, Bech, Arnold, Glass and Beyeler (2006, p. 1) found a network
topology on the interbank payment flows over the Fedwire Funds Service. These authors stated that
“At the apex of the U.S. financial system is a network of interconnected financial markets by which
domestic and international financial institutions allocate capital and manage their risk exposures.”
They found that only a small but tightly connected number of money-center banks to which all
other banks connect constitutes the majority of all payment sent over the Fedwire system.  
But the network structure of the federal funds market with its Fedwire settlement mechanism is not
an exclusive U.S. phenomenon. In fact, this market structure seems to be pervasive in the interbank
market from other countries. It has been found in Austria (Boss et. al., 2004), Japan (Inaoka et al.,
2004), Belgium (Degryse and Nguyen, 2004), Brazil (Jung Chang et. al., 2008) and Germany (Craig
and  von  Peter,  2014).   Additionally,  other  financial  markets  also  share  a  network  structure.
Empirical evidence of these structures were found in the municipal bond market (Schürhoff and Li,
2014), the corporate bond market (Di Maggio, Kermani and Song, 2017), and in the markets of
asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, commercial-mortgage-backed securities and
collateralized mortgage obligations (Hollifield, Neklyudov and Spatt, 2017). 
A decentralized  market  possesses  a  flexible  architecture  and  can  even  accommodate  or  imply
centralized institutions. As Beltran, Bolotnyy and Klee (2015, p. 2) described: “Often, one large
bank would buy funds from many smaller banks, and then the larger banks would connect to each
other and settle transactions either through a central clearinghouse, or later, through the Federal
Reserve.” In fact, Soramäki et. al., characterized the Fedwire as a star network where all banks are
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linked to a central hub (the Fed) via a shared telecommunications infrastructure (see Figure 2). One
of the most significant implications of viewing the economy as a network of interconnected markets
with a core-periphery structure is that the economy possesses a hierarchy and the wholesale money
market  is  the  center  of  the  system. Payment  system implies  a  credit  system (Mehrling,  2016).
Money is the means of final settlement and credit is just a promise to pay money or delaying final
settlement (see Mehrling, 2016). This is even more relevant in our world of central bank money
where “the price at which this money trades determines monetary policy” (Quinn and Roberds,
2007, p. 262). 
Figure 2: Diagram of a Fully Connected Star Network
Regarding  the  core-periphery  structure  observed  in  financial  networks,  Stigum  and  Crescenzi
(2007) found that in general larger banks were net buyers of federal funds, while smaller ones were
net  sellers  because  large  customers  tended  to  borrow  money  from the  former  but  individuals
deposited cash at  the latter.   Mehrling (2016) observes that many banks do not have access to
deposit at the Fed so they need to rely on a bank that has that privilege and, thus, a profitable spread
emerges  as  a  result  of  this  inequality.   Although slowly,  the  economic  literature  has  begun to
acknowledge the possibility that banks are not competitive and, therefore, positive economic profits
exist. Farboodi (2015, p. 1), for example, developed a model of the financial sector where “financial
institutions  have  incentives  to  capture  intermediation  spreads  through  strategic  borrowing  and
lending decisions. By doing so, they tilt the division of surplus along an intermediation chain in
their favor, while at the same time reducing aggregate surplus.” Additionally, empirical evidences in
the municipal bond market (Li and Schürhoff, 2014) and the corporate bond market (Di Maggio,
Kermani and Song, 2017) suggest the existence of intermediation rents.  Di Maggio et. al., (2017)
proved that in general dealers provide liquidity in time of crisis to the counterparties with whom
they have the strongest tie. In period of distress, the larger dealers exploit their connection and
charge higher prices to both the peripheral dealers and those clients who are not in their network. In
addition, clients of a failed dealer are forced to redirect their orders through longer intermediation
chains, which end up charging them much higher prices.
As  we  have  seen,  network  structures  not  only  can  be  applied  to  a  wide  range  of  economic
phenomena but  also  is  well  suited  to  a  formal  treatment  thanks  to  the  analytical  methodology
provided by Graph Theory. For example, following Gale and Kariv's mathematical representation
(2007, p. 100), the primitive of a financial network can be expressed as:
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A nonempty graph (N , E), where N is the collection of nodes, and E = ∪i=1
N {(i , j) : j∈N i} ⊂ N×N
is the set of edges.  Therefore, the set N i = { j :(i , j)∈E } represents the neighbors of agent i ,  that is,
the group of agents with whom agent i can trade.
Game theory offers a natural way to model the interactions among organizations or individuals who
are linked via a network because the payoffs that an economic agent receives from different choices
depend on the behavior of his neighbors (Jackson and Zenou, 2014).  In order to keep our model
computational tractable, we reduce the number of agents in the Dominium Mundi Game framework
to  only  two  basic  types:  the  ruling  class  and  the  people  (household).   Given  this  choice,  we
implicitly treat both public policies and the legal order as an equilibrium outcome generated by the
interaction among our two basic types of agents.  In this regard we are assuming that the rights of
the  people  (Law)  and  the  legal  norms sanctioned  by the  public  authorities  are  not  necessarily
equivalent as it was showed in the previous section.  This is in line with the observations of Pagano
and Volpin (2005, p. 1005) who wrote: “Laws result from the political process, however, which in
turn responds to economic interests.  In this sense, legal rules and economic outcomes are jointly
determined,  politics  being  the  link  between them.”   Explanations  for  the  observed relationship
between political power and wealth are not only offered by the economic literature (Rodríguez,
1997; Bénabou, 2000 and Esteban and Ray, 2006), but also can be traced back to Plato’s Republic
(c. 380 BC) in his discussion of the five types of regimes.
Given that we live now in a secular world order, we restrict our ruling class agent to the merchant
elite, in other words, we consider only wealthy traders and rich business people.  This assumption
implies that both the nobility and the clergy are rather nominal figures in our modern society and do
not exercise real control over the world's resources as they used to.  Anyhow, a king's  property is a
public good (Vitoria, 1546 and Ayala, c. 1804), and therefore, the jurisprudential criteria for the
qualification of unfair enrichment is more subtle in that case.  However, the above assumption does
not preclude the possibility of merchant princes like the Phoenician ruling class or the selfish use of
religion  and ideology.   We assume that  the  merchant  elite  is  organized  in  hierarchical  trading
networks as discussed earlier.  In our model, they are the only ones who can systematically extract
or  capture  rents  or  excess  returns  on  their  investments.   However,  they  do  not  create  any
technological  change  -this  is  a  simplifying  assumption,  which  will  be  later  relaxed  with  the
introduction of social mobility-.  As Donald Trump (2004) suggested, business people grab, fight
and win – they are the “overdog” [winners] in our model. This is so because the organization of a
market as hierarchical trading networks allows asymmetric information not only within the member
of the same network but also between the network's members and the rest of the population.  Given
this market structure, individuals connected to the merchant elite are more likely to occupy a high
public  office  than  agents  belonging  to  the  type  people  -“money  is  king”  or  at  least  matters-.
However, it is important to notice that in our model wealthy merchants are not parasites, they do
render  a  useful  service  to  society  in  the  form  of  intermediation,  coordination  or  aggregation
services.  They may be charming, educated, smart and hard working individuals who save a lot,
spend wisely and take risk.  But for our analysis, the fundamental difference between our two types
of agents is that the merchant elite is able to grab or receive more than what corresponds to their fair
share -Section 4 provides more information on this topic.  
On the other hand, the second type of agent in our model, people (household) not only provide
labor, service, human capital, consumption, saving and investment, but also are the first and true
inventors of any technological progress and have the right to vote in a representative democratic
election.  Given the above criterion, a merchant, inventor or entrepreneur who receives a fair profit
that is just enough to cover all his or her costs, including innovation costs and risk (eg., cost of
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capital or cost of equity – see Damodaran, 2012) would be classified as the type people.  From an
economic point of view, the agent people receive only the necessary incentives to carry out an
economic activity.   On the contrary,  the elite receives  true economic profits,  disproportionately
more of what would be suggested by a competitive equilibrium model or its extension when price-
taking competition cannot be supported in equilibrium (Romer, 1990).  It is worth noting that an
extension  to  competitive  equilibrium  may  include  innovations  with  zero  profit  conditions  in
expectation  (Matsuyama  et.  al.,  2012)  or  some  sort  of  optimal  taxation,  efficient  intellectual
property rights, restitution, reasonable regulation, etc.,  -more about this in Section 4.-  The key
point is that only the merchant elite possesses real negotiation power.
As  sociology  reminds  us,  the  division  of  a  society  in  two  agent  types  or  classes  will  bring
inexorably the problem of social mobility.  That is to say, how an agent that belongs to one social
category can move to another social category.  Even in the ancient  régime,  with its relative close
social  order, there were numerous examples of common people who moved to the rank of the
nobility by virtue of royal privilege.  The Rothschild family, whose most influential members were
granted  noble  titles  in  both  the  Holy  Roman Empire  and the  United  Kingdom,  is  a  canonical
example.  In today's secular world things are somehow different but the basic principle remains the
same.  The American Dream's ethos could help us to understand the concept of social mobility
within the Dominium Mundi Game context.  First of all, we must distinguish between an “American
Dream” that is consistent with the Law and an “American Dream” that goes against the Law.   As
we saw earlier, the Law (ius) and legal rules are not necessarily equivalent and when the difference
between them is significant we are in the presence of legal corruption -more about this in Section
4-.  For example, if the daughter of a very poor migrant establishes a successful business, trough
hard work, innovation, and risk-taking activities, and as a result of that she is fairly compensated for
her endeavour and can afford to live a very comfortable life, then she has achieved an “American
Dream” consistent with the Law.   According to the DMG framework, this hard-working woman
still belongs to the agent type people because she just got her fair share.  However, in order to be
consistent with reality, which also includes social mobility, the DMG allows a variable fraction of
agents of the type people to become part of the ruling class or merchant elite.   There are many
reasons that can justify this assumption.  In addition to bonds of marriage or religious affiliation -as
defined  earlier-,  an  outsider  can  be  accepted  as  a  member  of  a  powerful  hierarchical  network
because of a mutually-beneficial  relationship.   Outsiders can bring assets that are valuable to a
network such as political leverage, social connections or status, intellectual leadership, access to
resources, intellectual property rights, scarce talents, private information, etc.  The possibility of
social mobility from the common people, who can enjoy at most fair market returns, to the elite,
who  by  definition  possesses  above-market  returns,  brings  perverse  incentives  to  the  political
process given the cognitive biases introduced by conflicts of interest. Now, the DMG's agent type
people are endogenously divided by different expectations regarding social mobility of the class
that is not consistent with the Law but that the legal system allows it.  In Section 3, we examine the
technical details of why expectations in an economic model matter and how the incentive structure
of a repeated game is altered by them. 
The  above  assumptions  are  without  prejudice  of  any  liberal  democracy.   It  only  excludes  the
possibility of a Lincoln's ideal government of the people, by the people and for the people because
wealth concentration really  matters  and,  therefore,  unfair  enrichment  is  obviously feasible.   As
justice Louis D. Brandeis once said, “We must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we
may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both” (Brandeis University,
2007).    Democracy  is  based  on  the  principle:  “one  person,  one  vote,”  which  implies  that
politicians’ behavior must be driven by the needs and aspirations of their electorate.  But when
money enters  into  the  equation  as  in  campaign finance,  the  above premise  may not  hold.  For
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example, in two landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment provision
on  freedom  of  speech  severely  impairs  the  government's  ability  to  regulate  federal  campaign
contributions  and spending (Buckley v.  Valeo,  1976 and Citizens United v.  FEC, 2010).   As a
consequence of these rulings, special interest groups have the doors open for unlimited political
spending, which they can channel through devices such as super PACs in order to advance their
own agenda.  As a Congressional Research Service's report (Garrett, 2016, p. 5) stated: “super PACs
can substantially affect the political environment in which Members of Congress and other federal
candidates compete.”  Additionally, super PACs are not transparent.  “The original source of some
contributions to super PACs can be concealed (either intentionally or coincidentally) by routing the
funds through an intermediary” (Garrett, 2016, p. 10).  However, the judicial interpretation of the
U.S. Supreme Court regarding the freedom of speech in the context of campaign finance is just too
severe.  The Roman jurist  Modestinus (Digest 1.  3.  25) stated:  “Nulla iuris ratio aut aequitatis
benignitas  patitur,  ut  quae  salubriter  pro  utilitate  hominum  introducuntur,  ea  nos  duriore
interpretatione contra ipsorum commodum producamus ad severitatem.” This means that no reason
of law, nor the benignity of equity allows, that the things that are introduced healthily for the benefit
of the people,  we take them to severity  with a  harder  interpretation against  the welfare of  the
people.  Additionally, the judicial interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the freedom of
speech and its implications in campaign finance goes against the most basic principle of the Law
(understood as ius), which is to protect the weak against the abuse by the strong (Ayala, 1789, p.6).
Finally, the problems of transparency and secrecy in the political process are exacerbate not only by
the offshore interests and activities of many politicians and world leaders as it was revealed in the
Panama and Paradise Papers scandals, but also by new opportunities created by technology as it was
discovered in the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal.
3. Technical Details and the Case for Artificial Intelligence
After the discussion of the last two sections, we are ready to introduce the mathematical backbone
of the Dominium Mundi  Game framework, which is nothing else than a recursive structure called
“Dynamic Programming Squared” (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012). This is a method to encode
history  dependence  through  promised  values  where  value  functions  are  placed  inside  value
functions (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012).  That is to say, a mathematical structure characterized for
having a Bellman equation inside a Bellman equation where the inner Bellman equation describes
responses of an agent who incentives are affected by another one -eg., the policymaker- (Sargent,
2016).   In  this  context,  the  DMG's  framework is  consistent  with  the  ancient  Chinese  proverb,
quoted  and  popularized  by  Sargent  (2016):  “the  government  has  strategies.   The  people  have
counter-strategies”; but with the difference that we replace government by ruling class, which in our
case is the merchant elite.  Thanks to the “Dynamic Programming Squared” (DP2) technique, we
can formalize the DMG's Fundamental Inequality.
Taking the initial conditions as given, the fundamental problem of the agent type ruling class or
elite  is  to  choose  an  infinite  sequence  of  control  variables {εt , c t , v (x t+1)}t=0
∞ to  maximize  the
present value of their expected future rewards subject to some constraints.  For our greedy elite
agent, wealth is not only a mean to achieve an end but also an end for its own sake.   Therefore, we
can consider wealth accumulation like a proxy for the objective of the elite's optimization problem.
Under  this  formulation,  x is  the state variable,  which summarizes the state of the world at  the
beginning  of  each  period.   The  state  x could  be  a  high-dimensional  object x∈ℝn and ~x
represents the state  x in the next period (eg., from xt to  xt+1), which is governed by a controlled
Markov Process. c∈ℝk is the typical control or action variable, taken by agents each period after
observing the state s, ε∈ℝ l is the elite's exclusive decision variable and v : X→ℝ is the people´s
objective function to be maximized, where x ,~x∈X . The Bellman equation v (x ) denotes the
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optimal value of the people's problem starting from state  x, which is to maximize their expected
discounted utilities over time subject to their own set of constraints.   The DP2 framework allows the
agent type elite to manipulate people's continuation value function v (~x ) given their knowledge of
people's value function today  v(x).  As Sargent (2016) observed, this is a very powerful method
because it allows us to solve a maximization problem containing equilibrium constraints.  If we
make use of the Bellman's Principle of Optimality (see Stokey and Lucas with Prescott, 1989), we
can reformulate the elite's sequence problem into an equivalent problem characterized by functional
equations.  Following Sargent (2016) -with some slight modification-and without being bogging
down with cumbersome details, we can express the key basic mathematical relations of the DMG
framework as follows:
W (v (x ), x) = max
ε ,c ,v (x*)
{ R(x ,ε) + β∫W (v (~x ) ,~x )dΨ(~x∣x ,c ,ε)}
subject to
v (x ) = max
c
{u (x , c) + β∫ v (~x )dΩ(~x∣x , c ,ε)}, Ψ ,Ω≠F ∧ Ψ≠Ω
, the corresponding feasibility constraints and the incentive-compatibility constraints,
which characterize the best response of the agent type people to the terms and conditions
offered by the agent type elite.
W (v (x) , x ) represents the optimal value of the elite's problem starting from state x, β∈(0,1) is
a discount factor,  R is the elite's one-period reward function,  u is the people's one-period utility
function, Ψ and Ω are conditional probability distributions of the elite and the people respectively,
which are partly determined by the agents' actions.  F is the conditional probability distribution
corresponding to the true model of the world.  It is worth noting that in a rational expectation model
Ψ,  Ω  and F  would be all  equal.  The term ∫ v (~x )dΩ(⋯) can be interpreted as the people's
expected  next  period  value.   The same logic  applies  to  the  elite's  expected  next  period  value.
Without affecting the internal consistency of the DMG framework, we also maintain all the other
analytical  and  measure-theoretic  results,  properties,  assumptions  and  definitions  necessaries  to
render  this  formulation  tractable  (see  Stokey  and  Lucas  with  Prescott,  1989;  Ljungqvist  and
Sargent, 2012; Stachurski, 2009 and Sargent 2016).
Let W˚ (v (x) , x ) be the optimal value of a Benevolent Social Planner´s problem starting
from the state x  who only cares about maximizing the welfare of the people, that is to say,
in the Bellman equation W (⋯) we replace our greedy agent elite with a honest, prudent
ruler or a bonus pater familias ('good family father') to obtain W˚ (⋯)
Given that W (⋯) ,W˚ (⋯) ∈ ℝ
Δ(v (x) , x) = W (v ( x) , x) − W˚ (v (x) , x) > 0 , ∀ x
is the Fundamental Inequality that triggers the Dominium Mundi  Game.
 
Δ(v (x ), x)>0 can be interpreted as a metric for unfair enrichment when the state is  x and the
Benevolent Social Planner or the bonus pater familias can be interpreted as the personification of
the Law (understood as ius).
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                     W (v (x) , x ) = W˚ (v (x) , x) ⇔ lim
t→∞
{Ψt (⋯) ,Ωt(⋯)} = F(⋯)  
The above logical equivalence means that if and only if the Bellman equation W (⋯) is equal to
W˚ (⋯), because we have replaced the greedy agent elite with the Benevolent Social Planner, then
the  conditional  probability  distributions Ψ(⋯),Ω(⋯) converge  to F(⋯) , which  is  the  true
conditional probability distribution of the world.  That is to say, when the Law is firmly established,
the Dominium Mundi Game becomes a rational expectation model.
With a dynamic programming formulation, we can ruthless apply the self-evident premise of self-
interest.   We have no need of assuming an idealized form of government or the sanctity of the
central bank.  Additionally, we can incorporate Graph Theory to the DP2 framework so that we can
introduce hierarchical trading networks into the DMG model.  In fact, a more realistic formulation
for the Dominium Mundi Game would be Dynamic Programming Cubed (DP3).  This would allow
us  to  divide  the  agent  type  elite  into  two hierarchical  categories:  a  senior  elite  (eg.,  merchant
princes) and a junior elite (eg., connected wealthy merchants).  A DP4  formulation would be even
better for our modeling purpose but, unfortunately,  as the number of nested Bellman equations
increases, the complexity of the problem also grows.  
In summary, we have formulated above what it might be called a “nasty” optimization problem.  We
have  consciously  deposed  of  all  the  beautiful  simplifying  assumptions  that  make  our  lives  as
modelers relatively easy.  In the DMG framework, we don´t have competitive equilibrium or zero
profit conditions for the elite.  There is no rational expectation, perfect information or even perfect
government.  Now greed becomes a real headache as it seems to be in the real world.  Positive
incentives  alone  (eg.,  the  carrot)  will  not  work because  greed  is,  by  definition,  boundless  and
insatiable and, given the hierarchical structure of our model where the greedy elite is at the very top,
it will always find its way out of such restrictions.  We are forced to bring punishments -a sort of
negative  incentives  (eg.,  the  stick)-  into  our  model,  but,  unfortunately,  as  we  will  see  later,
punishments don´t work either.  So we have a very serious problem.   Greed cannot be tamed, it
reigns supreme.  As a result of that, the  Dominium Mundi Game is in essence a self-destructive
game.
Given our above discussion, we must reformulate our dynamic optimization framework into a full
game-theoretic approach.  Punishment can be introduced as a price that needs to be paid in order to
discipline “bad” behavior or deviation from cooperation or common interest with the aim that all
the “players” hold the necessary incentives to remain in the “game” (see Stigler, 1964; Osborne,
1976;  Spence,  1978a and  1978b;  Friedman,  1971).  In  the  most  general  sense,  the  equilibrium
strategies must embrace a mechanism that deters agents from cheating (for example, in the case of
colluding  firms,  a  defective  behavior  would  be  increasing  output  or  cutting  prices).   If  these
punishments (eg., reverting from collusion to competitive equilibrium, expelling the defecting agent
from a well-positioned network,  voting against a corrupt government,  etc.)  are large enough to
outweigh the  benefits  from bad behavior,  then  collusion,  cooperation,  policy agreement  or  any
expected behavior is sustainable (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986).
As Green and Porter (1984) brilliantly observed,  in a certainty world, punishment would not be a
problem because incentives are so perfect aligned that the deterrent mechanisms are never observed
in equilibrium.   Therefore, given that our approach assumes that punishments do happen, the DMG
framework must be based on imperfect information.  However, our model includes a third feature,
which  has  not  been  studied  in  the  literature  of  recursive  games.   This  is  the  possibility  of
transferring punishment from one agent to another one, so that the dynamics of the game with its
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implied allocation of benefits could be preserved for a longer period.  This particular characteristic
of the  Dominium Mundi Game is consistent with the sacrificial nature of the ancient Phoenician
religion described earlier.  Wrongful acts bring always negative consequences and if the culprits are
not held accountable, somebody else will have to suffer the consequences.  This is consistent with
the natural principle that something can not be obtained out of nothing.  Two recent examples of
transferability  of punishments  can be found in the 2008 global  financial  crisis  and in  the U.S.
withdrawal  from the  Paris  Climate  agreement  of  2015.   The latter  is,  as  we will  see  later,  in
detriment of the planet and all future generations.  But regarding the former, Stigliz (forthcoming, p.
7 and 4) wrote “our legal system, which has failed to hold accountable almost any of those culpable
for the crisis.  It is this failure, combined with the fact that so many bankers managed to walk away
with mega-bonuses, which has led to disillusionment in our economic and political system, with
widely held beliefs that it is “rigged” and unfair.”  Stiglitz added “they keep the profits in good
times, while the public bears the losses in bad [eg., through bailout, etc.].”  What Stiglitz affirms is
exactly what we mean by a transfer of punishment.  In his example, the transfer goes from those
who  were  responsible  for  the  financial  crisis,  profited  from it  and  walked  away  with  blatant
impunity to the taxpayers and other economic agents who suffered its negative consequences (eg.,
unemployment, poverty, bankruptcy, credit rationing, reduction of social security benefits, social
unrest etc.)  
The conclusions drawn by two experts cited by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC)'s
report (2011) can shed more lights on the above issue.  The first expert is William K. Black, a
professor with expertise on white-collar crime and a former bank regulator.He affirmed that “The
claim that no one could have foreseen the crisis is false” (FCIC, 2011, p. 15).  Again, this powerful
statement suggests that the financial crisis was not an unanticipated event.  If that were the case, the
reasonable presumption would be that somebody should have known what was going on.  This
would be a problem of asymmetric information.   Black even wrote a book with the title: The Best
Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One: How Corporate Executives and Politicians Looted the S&L
Industry.   The second expert who gave testimony to the FCIC is Henry N. Pontell,  a professor
emeritus of criminology at the University of California, Irvine.  He stated: “Lax or practically non-
existent  government  oversight  created  what  criminologists  have  labeled  ‘crime-facilitative
environments,’ where crime could thrive” (FCIC, 2011, p. 161).  U.S. senator Elizabeth Warren
went even further calling this situation “too big to fail has become too big for trial” (Warren, 2013).
Again, the framework provided by the Dominium Mundi Game is capable of dealing with situations
where “unethical” behavior or wrongful acts are an integral part of the economic activity.  Here is
where a network as a  formal  arrangement to  describe a  market  structure shines above all  else.
Criminal activities are a group phenomenon and have been depicted in the literature as networks
(Sutherland, 1947; Haynie, 2001; Sarnecki, 2001; Warr, 2002; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004;
Jackson and  Zenou,  2014).  It  is  important  that  we  do not  underestimate  the  true  impact  of  a
financial crisis.  It is indeed a very dangerous game. It is like playing with fire.  For example, the
Great Depression, lasting from 1929 to 1939, was not only limited to severe economic hardship.   In
his 1999 Nobel prize's lecture, Robert Mundell made one of the boldest statement in the history of
economics  when  he  affirmed  that  “had  the  price  of  gold  been  raised  in  the  late  1920’s,  or,
alternatively, had the major central banks pursued policies of price stability instead of adhering to
the gold standard, there would have been no Great Depression, no Nazi revolution and no World
War II” (Mundell, 2000, p. 331).
Because our model is based on imperfect monitoring, punishments will occur on the equilibrium
path.  Therefore, under certain conditions, players could prefer the minimum punishment necessary
to create the appropriate intertemporal incentives (Obara, 2003).  But if instead of receiving the
minimum punishment, agents could transfer it with impunity to somebody else, they might do so
depending on the their beliefs and preferences.  Given that we assume both profit maximization
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(greed) and biased belief in the face of conflicts of interest, this transfer of punishment or sacrifice
is much more likely to occur in our model than in a model of pure rational expectations.   The
inclusion of this feature provides the DMG framework not only with more realistic and powerful
dynamics, but also with the means to make endogenous otherwise external shocks such as financial
crises, deep economic downturns, political upheavals, and social unrest.  As a modeling device, we
could add to a DMG model an external sector in order to take into account the interactions of our
agents  with  foreign  nations  and  the  environment,  which  are  both  easy  targets  for  transferring
punishments  given  their  intrinsic  vulnerabilities  or  the  marginal  role  that  both  play  in  the
democratic process of our agents’ own political institutions.  Neither an unborn child nor a foreigner
can vote.  For them, it is like receiving “taxation without representation.” In this way, more complex
and destructive adverse shocks such as war and man-made environmental catastrophes can arise
endogenously in equilibrium.  Once we take into account all facts, interpretations, concepts and
assumptions discussed until now, we are ready to formulate the first conjecture derived from the
Dominium Mundi Game framework.
First Conjecture: Adam Smith's invisible hand -properly interpreted- doesn't lead society to the
maximum good, but on the contrary, it triggers the Dominium Mundi Game,  Δ(v(x),x)>0 ∀ x ,
leading society through a series  of  man-made adverse  shocks to  the  maximum evil.   Greed is
welfare minimizer not welfare maximizer.  
Adam Smith's classical case of “free” market in absence of monopolies or privileges granted to
companies by an independent government is not sufficient to guarantee competitive equilibrium.
Greed will find its way out of the restrictions imposed by Smith´s form of competition and will
make society to end up in the worst possible equilibrium.   Tempted by the illusion of boundless
power and wealth, greed degenerates in a self-destructive behavior like some in the Antiquity could
wisely foresee (Plato, c. 380 BC; Ezekiel 28).  The basic intuition behind this powerful statement
comes from the following two arguments.  First, as we saw in Section 1, Adam Smith's invisible
hand is not equivalent to perfect competition, competitive equilibrium or zero profit conditions as
many economists have wrongly believed.  Second, when greed is mixed up with the other two
elements of human nature (human fallibility and human sociability), as it was described in Section
2,  transferability  of  punishments  not  only  becomes  feasible  -given  the  presence  of  powerful
hierarchical trading  networks-  but  also  generates  man-made  adverse  shocks,  which  might  be
amplified  over  time  until  the  worst  equilibrium is  finally  reached.   We could  think  about  the
consequences of transferability of punishment as if it were a debt with a very high compounding
interest  rate,  which is rolled over until  a point in time where further extensions are not longer
possible and the whole debt with all its accumulated interests have to be settled.  It is a sort of a
natural  law,  a  judgment  day  executed  by  “nature”  where  bad  actions  will  always  bring  bad
reactions.  Because “there is no such a thing as a free lunch,” sooner o later punishment will take
place.  
The  seminal  paper  of  Green  and  Porter  (1984),  which  deal  with  problems  that  arise  in
noncooperative collusion under uncertainty, is our starting point to the journey of understanding the
DMG's First Conjecture.  These authors stated that given imperfect price information, firms cannot
form a sustainable self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits, but rather a cyclical pattern
emerges,  where  the  economy alternates  between collusion  (monopolistic  conduct)  and Cournot
behavior (a punishment phase from the perspective of firms).  What Green and Porter (1984) mean
is that in a world of imperfect monitoring, it is not feasible the type of James Friedman's (1971)
colluding oligopolies that exhibit permanent monopolistic profits by virtue of threats of reverting to
more competitive behaviors whenever a single firm defects from a cartel.   In their own words,
“Each  firm  faces  a stationary  two-state  (normal  and  reversionary)  T-stage  Markov  dynamic
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programming problem.  Its optimal policy is to produce zi in reversionary periods, and to produce
some fixed quantity r in normal periods.”  
What is really interesting in Green and Porter (1984) is the fact that even though firms know that
low prices may reflect demand conditions and not actual cheating, it is still optimal for them to
break the cartel temporarily and compete among each other.  According to the authors (p. 94), the
answer to this puzzle is “that everyone understands the incentives properties of equilibrium.  If
firms did not revert to Cournot behavior in response to low prices, equation (5) would not hold the
rest of the time, so monopolistic behavior would cease to be individually optimal for firms.”  This is
a remarkable finding that unfortunately has been overshadowed in the economic literature by the
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (APS)'s (1990, p.1054) powerful bang-bang principle, which states
that “efficient incentive schemes must necessarily have a bang-bang structure.” In other words,
“efficiency demands that nonextremal points of the payoff set are never used” (p. 1044).  APS
(1990, p. 1058) eloquently built a case against Green and Porter (1984) in the following terms: “In a
finite  action  Green-Porter  model,  for  example,  losses  will  result  from  restricting  attention  to
punishments no worse than ‘Cournot-Nash reversion.’  Even if this restriction is imposed…, it is
best to use punishments involving permanent reversion, rather than temporary reversion followed
by resumed cooperation...”  In spite of APS's critic, we can bring two arguments in favor of Green
and Porter (1984).  First, the complexity of reality may impose restrictions or additional constraints
on agents’ strategy space.  Second, as we saw in the previous section, no all relevant models need to
be based exclusively on perfect rationality.  In fact, the Dominium Mundi Game offers a theoretical
reason to justify Green and Porter's (1984) approach.  Given the cognitive bias caused by conflicts
of interest, greedy agents of the type ruling class or merchant elite underestimate systematically the
worst equilibrium until it is too late -climate change deniers and “business-as-usual” mentality are
examples of that. Therefore, the moderate punishment value introduced in Green and Porter (1984)
and Porter (1983) may be constrained optimal as even APS (1990, p. 1058) recognized.  However,
in the DMG framework, the key difference with respect to Green and Porter (1984) is that moderate
punishment might be an illusion and not a real equilibrium outcome.  In other words, the moderate
punishment is based on the agents' biased expectations and not on the true model of the world.
Sooner or later, reality will turn out to be much worse.
Green and Porter (1984) offer two properties that could be generalized in the framework of the
Dominium Mundi Game.   First, their trigger-strategy equilibrium is able to establish endogenous
cycles  based  exclusively  on  the  behavior  of  profit-maximizing  agents  who  interact  in  an
environment with uncertainty.  It is not necessary a technological shock or a change in fundamentals
to provoke such a dynamics.  Second, firms voluntarily and deliberately accept a moderate bad
equilibrium (reversionary period) as a necessary evil that ironically serves their best interests.  It is
important to understand than in dynamic games, at any history, the concept of Nash equilibrium is
too  permissive  because  it  doesn't  enforce  any  optimality  conditions  in  the  remaining  game
(Yeltekin, Cai and Judd, 2017).   Therefore, equilibrium solutions for recursive games must obey
sequential rationality (Green, 1980; Kreps and Wilson, 1982 and APS 1986 and 1990).  Green and
Porter (1984, p. 93) summarized the result of their equilibrium analysis in the following terms: “the
marginal return to a firm from increasing its production in normal period [cheating] must be offset
exactly by the marginal increase in risk of suffering a loss in returns [punishment] by triggering a
reversionary episode.”  
Unfortunately, the Dominium Mundi Game (DMG) is much more complex than Green and Porter
(1984) at least in three fundamental ways.  First, in Green and Porter (1984), the trigger variable
used for monitoring, the price of the undifferentiated product, is not only imperfectly correlated
with firms’ conduct, but also observed publicly, so the game has a nice recursive structure and even
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a Folk Theorem can be derived  (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994). In contrast, in the DMG
framework,  the  key  trigger  variable  is  Δ (v(x),x), whose  observability  is  subject  not  only  to
problems  associated  with  human  fallibility  and  hidden  information  but  also  to  problems  of
disinformation (deception).  The DMG is based on asymmetric information due to its hierarchical
network topology.  Agents at the very bottom of the hierarchy (the people) do not have access to the
information that  agents at  the very top (merchant  princes)  possess.   Even worse,  agents  at  the
periphery of the same trading network don't know what agents at the core know.  There is clearly
private  information,  which  is  exploited  ruthlessly  with  the  aim  to  maximize  profit.   Human
fallibility also affects to the type of agents at the bottom, the people.   The problem of the people is
that they not only don’t have access to all information, but also they are victims of disinformation
campaigns,  which  are  generated  endogenously  in  the  model  as  part  of  the  profit-maximization
strategies of the key beneficiaries  of the trading networks.   This create a big problem because
people like the other agents are bounded rational, so the presence of both private information and
disinformation impair severely their beliefs about their environment.  This, in turn, affects human
sociability  through  religion  affiliation  and  participation.   In  the  previous  section,  we  defined
religion in a very broad and general sense as a system of beliefs (including ideology) that create
strong bonds or ties among people like if they were a family.  So, as a consequence of the above,
divisions  within  religions  and  conflicts  among  them  emerge  endogenously  in  a  DMG  model.
Expectations  regarding  social  mobility  make  things  even  worse.   Thus,  ideology,  religious
fanaticism  and  legal  corruption  (eg.,  loopholes,  legal  tricks  and  the  legitimization  of  unfair
enrichment) arise in equilibrium.  This powerful implication means that when the Law is not firmly
established, people can be fooled all the time.
Second, as discussed earlier, the DMG introduces the possibility of transferability of punishments,
which basically means that the stronger party, instead of being himself punished for his wrongful
act, transfers to the weaker party the negative consequences of such action.  This is consistent with
the natural principle that something can not be obtained out of nothing: actions have consequences.
Human fallibility also affects our agents at the very top of the hierarchical trading network (the
merchant princes).  Given the model design, they have access to more information than anybody
else.  They are the agents who get the closest to the idealized concept of rational expectations.
However, given their exorbitant wealth, power and influence, they suffer from cognitive biases due
to conflicts of interest.  The moderate punishment might be an illusion based on biased expectation.
The real punishment may be in fact much worst but because the elite is in some sort of constant
denial, as if they were unconscious individuals, they continue acting in a business-as-usual fashion
until it is too late.  
Third,  we cannot reduce our problem, as in  Green and Porter  (1984),  to a stationary two-state
(normal v. reversionary) T-stage problem or as APS's (1986 and 1990) stationary best and worst
symmetric sequential equilibrium.  The empirical evidence seems to suggest that man-made adverse
shocks are not constant over time, but rather nonstationary.  In the DMG, adverse shocks come in a
discontinuous fashion with different intensities and durations until the game is finally over, which
means from societal  collapse to  total  annihilation.   This  illustration reflects  the self-destructive
nature of greed as opposed to Adam Smith's benevolent apology.  In the DMG, the ruling class or
elite type of agents underestimates systematically this perverse dynamics because they suffer from
cognitive bias due to conflicts of interest -they only see what they want to see.  Irrationality is an
intrinsic part of the Dominium Mundi Game.
As we move from a dynamic optimization framework to a game-theoretic approach, it would be
convenient  to  take  advantage  of  the  powerful  tools  offered  by  the  theory  of  recursive  games.
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (APS) (1986) showed that optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-
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Porter model exist with a simple intertemporal structure. The technique employed by them was to
reduce the repeated game to a family of static games.  They introduced novel concepts such as
factorization and self-generation. Regarding factorization, the key insight is that in a symmetric
sequential  equilibrium,  the  total  game  payoffs  can  be  factored  or  decomposed,  in  a  dynamic
programming manner, into today's payoffs (eg.,  first-period reward) and continuation payoffs (a
kind of promise of some discounted expected value of the reward function for the remainder of the
game).  It is worth mentioning that these continuation payoffs could be used to incorporate what we
meant by “expectations” in our discussion on social mobility introduced in the previous section.
Every decision or action that belongs to an equilibrium strategy, it should induce an optimal strategy
for the remainder of the game (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).  APS (1986, 1990) developed set-valued
dynamic programming techniques for solving recursive games, showing that the set of equilibrium
payoffs is a fixed point of a monotone operator, which resembles the Bellman operator (see Judd et.
al., 2003).  As Sargent (2012) observed, APS (1986, 1990) found it is more efficient to deal with the
set of continuation values tied with equilibrium strategies than it is to work directly with the set of
equilibrium strategies.  The APS's approach is well-suited with the Dynamic Programming Squared
formulation presented earlier because we need to map two continuation values into one, as opposed
to traditional dynamic programming, which maps one continuation value tomorrow into one value
equation today (Sargent, 2012).
According to Yeltekin, Cai, and Judd (YCJ) (2017), one can find a recursive operator that not only
maps tomorrow subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoffs into today SPE payoffs, but also maps
compact  correspondences  to  compact  correspondences  and,  in  addition,  is  monotone.   The
advantage of their approach is that allow the application of numerical methods for computing all
SPE of recursive games with discrete states.  Otherwise, as YCJ (2017) point out,  one will  be
confined to consider only special cases given that dynamic games admit a multiplicity of equilibria.
However, the problem for us with the YCJ's (2017) approach is that although they found an efficient
method to compute equilibria in dynamic games, it appears that their method is applicable only to
cases of perfect monitoring.  For the case of repeated or dynamic games with imperfect monitoring,
Burkov and  Chaib-draa  (2015,  p.  884)  state  that  “to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  are  no
algorithmic computational methods capable of finding such equilibria.”  These authors (2013, p. 23)
also provide an intuitive description of the main challenges that arise in this class of games.  They
said that “when monitoring is imperfect, not every deviation can be immediately and with certainty
detected, as well as the identity of deviator cannot always be precisely determined.  Therefore, an
important part of the analysis in games of imperfect monitoring is devoted to specifying conditions,
under  which the deviations  are  detectable  and the deviators  are  identifiable.”   This compelling
statement might lead us to the temptation of simplifying and reducing the Dominium Mundi Game
(DMG) into a game with public monitoring like the one studied by Green and Porter (1984) and
APS (1986, 1990).  But, unfortunately, this approach would change the nature of the DMG into
something else, which may be irrelevant or even misleading for our purpose.  
As we discussed earlier, the ancient Phoenician showed us the power of secrecy, starting with their
own bizarre religion, as a key factor for the consolidation of their all-powerful hierarchical trading
network.  The private information that results from this fact could be considered as a very subtle
form of a trade secret.  Even in modern times, we can find many concrete examples of private or
hidden information.   Pope Clement XII issued in 1738 a papal bull In eminenti apostolatus specula
banning  Catholics  from  joining  Freemasons,  which  was  even  confirmed  in  1983  by  the
Congregation  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Faith  (Ratzinger  and  Hamer,  1983).   Recent  scandals  as
Panama  and  Paradise  papers,  Facebook-Cambridge  Analytica  and  many  other  related  to  the
financial industry (Mallaby, 2010; Litterick, 2002; Neate, 2016; Kolhatkar, 2016; Wilmarth, 2014;
Whalen and Tan Bhala,  2011; Freifeld,  2016; Balzli,  2010; Nelson, et.  al.,  2017; Parikh,  2017;
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Jayachandran  and  Kremer,  2006;  Stiglitz,  2018  and  forthcoming;  FCIC,  2011;  Webel,  2013;
Mehrling, 2016; Hou and Skeie, 2014) support the asseveration that private or hidden information is
a key feature of today´s world as it was in the past.  In fact, Michael Bowling et al., (2017), when
comparing the realism of imperfect vs perfect information games, quoted John von Neumann, the
founder of game theory,  in a conversation recounted by Bronowski, when he said: “Real life is not
like that [referring to perfect information games].  Real life consists of bluffing, or little tactics of
deception, of asking yourself what is the other man going to think I mean to do.  And that is what
games are about in my theory.”
The technical challenges for solving a  Dominium Mundi Game come mainly from two sources.
First, as showed earlier, the DMG's basic functional equations follow a recursive structure called
Dynamic Programming Squared.  Additionally, the APS's (1986, 1990) powerful methodology (eg.,
factorization, self-generation, bang-gang theorem) is based on recursive game theory.  For high-
dimensional problems,  this  method  runs  into  a  technical  difficulty  known  as  the  “curse  of
dimensionality”  (Bellman,  1957),  where  the  complexity  of  the  algorithm grows  exponentially.
Second, repeated games with private or hidden information still remain an open research challenge.
Little is known about the characterization of the optimality properties of these games, let alone the
computation  of  their  equilibria  (Levin,  2006;  Kandori,  2002;  Burkov  and  Chaib-draa,  2014).
There are uncertainties in both the game dynamics and the opponents’ strategies.  For example, in
the card game Poker, Southey et. al. (2012, p. 1) stated that, “Uncertainty in the game stems from
partial information, unknown opponents, and game dynamics dictated by a shuffled deck.  Add to
this the large space of possible game situations in real poker games such as Texas hold’em, and the
problem becomes very difficult indeed.”   So what can we do?  We propose that we should start to
think out of the box and go beyond operator-theoretic techniques.  
Given the above situation, our problem would be how to solve the Dominium Mundi Game so that
we can accept or reject our first conjecture based on some sort of approximate solution to the DMG
model.  As suggested by John Nash's 1950 Phd thesis, a formal proof might not be feasible.  In
other  words,  the realistic  goal  might  be not  to  find a  direct  mathematical  proof  to the DMG's
conjectures,  but  rather  to  determine  the  model  implications  with  respects  to  its  theoretical
definitions and assumptions.  This will bring us inexorably to the discussion of what constitutes a
proof of a conjecture in social science.  How can we proof Adam Smith's invisible hand, especially
when we know from our previous discussion that his conjecture is not equivalent to Arrow's (1951)
and Debreu's (1959) competitive equilibrium?  If Adam Smith were right with his invisible hand
properly interpreted, then the  Dominium Mundi Game's First Conjecture would be false and vice
versa because they are exactly the opposite.  Before we proceed into this analysis it would be useful
to remember the words of Kenneth Judd (1998, p. 8-9 and 12) who stated: “One example is not a
proof of a proposition; neither do a million examples constitute a proof of any proposition. While
the latter is far more convincing than one example, a theorem about a continuum of special tractable
cases  does  not  prove  anything  general...  A  computational  approach  will  have  to  focus  on
computationally  tractable  cases,  but  those  cases  will  be  far  more  general  than  cases  that  are
analytically tractable and amenable to theorem-proving.” 
In order to gain further intuition on how to solve our model, we could make an analogy between the
Dominium Mundi Game and the Nazi Enigma Machine, which was a  cryptographic device with
nearly 159 quintillion (1018)  different setting (Wikipedia,  2018).   So cracking the Enigma code
would be like finding an approximate solution to the DMG.  Under this framing of the problem, the
insights of Marian Rejewski and Alan Turing could be useful for our purpose.  One of their key
contributions was to devise an electro-mechanical machine to accomplish the task of deciphering
the encrypted messages generated by Enigma.  According to Gordon Welchman (1982, p. 120),
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another inventor of this type of code-breaking machines, "... the task of the bombe [the machine that
cracked Enigma] was simply to reduce the assumptions of wheel order and scrambler positions that
required  'further  analysis'  to  a  manageable  number".   So  the  central  message  of  the  Enigma
experience was to use a machine to reduce an information problem that seemed intractable into a
problem that was manageable within the available resources.  But this is precisely what intelligence
is all about.   The word intelligence comes from the Latin word intellegere, whose term is composed
of the Latin prefix inter, which means “between” and the Latin verb legere, which means “choose,
read” (Helena, 2018).  So intelligence is the ability to choose between two alternatives or among
alternatives, the right one or the best one.  So in essence, intelligence depends on the nature of the
problem to  be  solved,  and therefore,  it  encompasses  from special-purpose  intelligence  like  the
cryptologic machines that cracked the Enigma code to general-purpose intelligence like the human
mind.   It is not a surprise that the same Alan Turing was also very passionate about the theoretical
problems posed with the generalization of machine intelligence.  He not only introduced the idea of
a universal Turing machine (UTM), but also many other ideas, for which he has been credited as the
father of artificial intelligence (wikipedia, 2018).  For solving the Dominium Mundi Game, we need
definitely machine intelligence but rather a more general one than the traditional operator-theoretic
techniques found in dynamic programming and recursive game theory.
In his paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950, p. 456), Alan Turing wrote: “Instead of
trying to produce a programme to simulate the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one which
simulates the child's? If this were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would
obtain the adult brain...  We have thus divided our problem into two parts. The child-programme
and the education process. These two remain very closely connected.”  Turing (1950) stated that the
above method is  faster  than  an  evolutionary  approach  based on natural  selection  with  random
mutations because the programmer through careful observations and logical reasoning could speed
that process up.  He also provided some of the basic insights used in many of today's most powerful
machine learning algorithms.  Turing indicated (1950, p. 457): “We normally associate punishments
and  rewards  with  the  teaching  process.  Some  simple  child-machines  can  be  constructed  or
programmed on this  sort  of principle.  The machine has to be so constructed that events which
shortly  preceded the  occurrence of  a  punishment-signal  are  unlikely to  be repeated,  whereas  a
reward-signal increased the probability of repetition of the events which led up to it.”
Turing's insightful observations are truly remarkable, especially because they were published in
1950 when computer science was still an emerging discipline.  We will call Turing's approach to
machine intelligence, artificial intelligence, which, as he pointed out, is divided into two parts.  The
“child-programme” and the “education process”.   The latter  is  what now is  known as machine
learning and the former is what needs to be defined.  However, it is worth noting that we are not
interested in simulating the child's mind as if it were a  Homo economicus, the unnatural agent of
neoclassical economics who can be both perfectly rational and perfectly greedy.   Instead, we are
interested in simulating the child's mind as a synthetic  Homo sapiens, characterized by the three
elements  of  human  nature  -self-interest,  human  fallibility  and  human  sociability-  as  described
earlier (see also Thaler, 2000 and Stiglitz, 1991).  So our child-metaprogramme is more consistent
with human intelligence than the one based on the fictitious  Homo economicus  (cf.  Parkes and
Wellman, 2015). 
The  economic  literature  is  incorporating,  albeit  rather  slowly,  more  heterodox  approaches  for
solving economic models.  For example, Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010) introduced a cluster-grid
projection method to solve model with high dimensionality.   They identified clusters on simulated
series and took advantage of clusters’ centers as a grid for projections. They stated (p.  1) that:
“Making the  grid endogenous to  the model  allows us  to  avoid costs  associated  with finding a
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solution in areas of state space that are never visited in equilibrium.”  Richard Evans et. al., (2016)
applied big data techniques in a rather novel way: to solve theoretical models “that are otherwise
too complex” with large dimensions  of heterogeneity,  nonconvex optimization problems, multi-
objective programming problems, rich policy structure and uncertainties in both model and policy
objective. They (2016, p. 1) “sample the parameter space of a parametric model and use the large
sample  to  address  a  research  question.”  Hart  and  Mas-Colell  (2000)  introduced  in  the  journal
Econometrica an  adaptive  algorithm  called  “regret-matching”,  which  computes  the  correlated
equilibria of a game.  Neller and Lanctot (2013, p. 1) observed that Hart and Mas-Colell's simple
procedure “has sparked a revolution in computer game play of some of the most difficult bluffing
games, including clear domination of annual computer poker competitions.” In words of their own
inventors (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, p.1128), their procedure can be summarized as follow: “...At
each period, a player may either continue playing the same strategy as in the previous period, or
switch  to  other  strategies,  with  probabilities  that  are  proportional  to  how  much  higher  his
accumulated payoff would have been had he always made that change in the past.”  Neller and
Lanctot  (2013)  have  showed  not  only  how a  computer  can  use  the  regret-matching  algorithm
through self-simulated  plays,  but  also how this  approach can  be  extended to  sequential  games
through an algorithm called counterfactual regret minimization (CRM).    In 2015, Michael Bowling
et.  al.  (2017,  p.  81)  presented  an  improved  version  of  CRM,  which  was  “capable  of  solving
extensive-form games three orders of magnitude larger than previously possible.”  They claimed
that “the smallest variant of poker in-play, heads-up limit Texas hold’em, is now essentially weakly
solved.”  This is an extraordinary accomplishment because, as we saw earlier, Poker is an imperfect
information game where players have private information.   However,  it  seems that while game
theory has reached a plateau in economics, other disciplines, mainly computer science, are taking
game-theoretic  approaches  to  a  new high.    As  Figure  3  shows,  three  sub-fields  of  study are
converging  into  a  powerful  and  consistent  approach  that  could  give  rise  to  a  truly  artificial
intelligence.  In addition to game theory, the other two sub-fields are deep learning and multi-agent
reinforcement learning.
Figure 3: The Emergence of Artificial Intelligence
First of all,  we shall say that Dynamic Programming, which is a very popular problem-solving
technique among economists,  and reinforcement learning (RL) are closely related to each other
(Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Busoniu et al., 2010 and Bertsekas, 2012).  However, as Sutton and
Barto (1998) and Busoniu et al. (2010) pointed out, there is a fundamental difference between both
approaches; RL not only doesn’t require a formal model or a complete understanding of the system,
but also can work in the absence of relevant data collected beforehand. This extremely flexible
algorithm can learn control policies by interacting with an unknown system.   That is to say, a RL
algorithm can generate its own data and learn from them.  Thus, RL not only belongs to the class of
machine learning algorithms, but also could be well suited to deal with many of the problems of
25
Deep 
Learning
Game
 Theory
Reinforcement 
Learning
imperfect  information  games.   In  this  regards,  Burkov  and  Chaib-draa  (2014,  p.  23)  observe:
“Imperfect private monitoring can be compared with the notion of partial observability well known
in the computer science...  Indeed, the imperfect monitoring setting is  closely related to general
MAS  [Multiagent  Systems],  because  the  model  of  artificial  agent  assumes  an  uncertain
observability of the environment by the agent due to its noised sensors...”  
Secondly,  for  large  state-action  spaces  both  Dynamic  Programming  and  RL require  function
approximation and, in this regard, deep learning, given the right conditions, shines above everything
else.   In  addition  to  its  empirical  success  in  computer  vision  (Voulodimos,  et  al.,  2018  and
Krizhevsky et al., 2012), natural language processing (Young et al., 2018 and Hinton et al., 2012),
time series analysis (Thinsungnoen et al.,  2017 and Goodfellow et al.,  2016), stochastic control
problems (Han and E Weinan, 2016), high dimensional partial differential equations (E Weinan, et
al., 2017) and game playing (Silver et al., 2017 and Justesen, et al., 2017), another reason to support
the above claim is due to the fact that neural networks are universal approximators (Hornik et al.
1989;  Hornik 1991 and Poggio et al. 2015).  However, not all neural networks are the same and
there is a fundamental difference between a deep and a shallow network.  Liang and Srikant (2017,
p.1) have proved that  “for a large class of piecewise  smooth functions, the number of neurons
needed  by  a  shallow  network  to  approximate  a  function  is  exponentially  larger  than  the
corresponding  number  of  neurons  needed  by  a  deep  network  for  a  given  degree  of  function
approximation.”
Finally, we can combine the above techniques to produce even more powerful algorithms.  For
example, Mnih et al., (2015) announced an algorithm called deep Q-network that used both deep
learning and reinforcement learning, which achieved human-level performance in classic Atari 2600
games.   Similarly,  deep  reinforcement  learning  has  been integrated  with  game theory  to  solve
imperfect-information games.  In 2016, Heinrich and Silver (p. 1) introduced a deep reinforcement
learning from self-play, which according to them, it was “the first scalable end-to-end approach to
learning  approximate  Nash  equilibrium  without  prior  domain  knowledge.”   They  tested  their
algorithm  successfully  in  both  two-player  zero-sum  computer  poker  games  and  Limit  Texas
Hold’em.  Using deep neural networks together with tabula rasa reinforcement learning, Silver et
al.,  (2017)  generalized  the  popular  AlphaGo  Zero  program  in  order  to  achieve  superhuman
performance in other games.  They (2017, p. 1) claim that “Starting from random play, and given no
domain knowledge except the game rules, AlphaZero achieved within 24 hours a superhuman level
of play in the games of chess and shogi (Japanese chess) as well as Go, and convincingly defeated a
world-champion program in each case.”
However, for our modeling purpose, one of the most relevant breakthrough regarding the consistent
application  of  different  approaches  came in 2018 when a team of  Google-DeepMind scientists
(Tuyls,  et.  al.,  2018)  introduced what  they called  “A Generalized  Method for  Empirical  Game
Theoretic Analysis”.  A meta game is the key concept of what is known as an empirical game-
theoretic analysis.  This meta game is understood as a simplified version of a more complex game,
so that the analysis of a game is based exclusively on the meta-strategies that are normally played
(eg., passive/aggressive or tight/loose in the case of poker) and not in all possible strategies that the
full game may possess (Tuyls, et. al., 2018).  This approach is justified when it is not computational
feasible to enumerate all the game's strategies.  Among the main contributions of Tuyls, et. al., 2018
were not only to prove that a Nash equilibrium for the empirical game, which is based on empirical
estimates, is a 2ε-Nash equilibrium for the true underlying game, but also to determine how many
data samples are needed to reach a reasonable approximation of the full game.  The authors applied
their  generalized game-theoretic method even to asymmetric games such as Leduc Poker using
multiagent reinforcement learning.  
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The central message of this section is that with artificial intelligence we can make even Enrico
Fermi's agent-based techniques, which is also popular among economists, Lucas-critique (1976)
proof by having agents respond to events according to the fundamental forces of human nature such
as self-interest (see Turrell, 2016), human fallibility and human sociability.  Hopefully, this would
allow us to find an approximate solution to the DMG.  In any case, there is no need to assume
arbitrary, unrealistic, unreasonable or “politically correct” assumptions or behavioral rules.  We can
build models completely on primitives, finding causal relationship and “treating the cause rather
than the symptom”.
4. Empirical Relevance and Policy Implications
The conventional wisdom in economics based on competitive equilibria,  zero economic profits,
rational expectations and perfect government/central bank looks at odds with the real world.  This is
particularly striking given the pervasive use of econometrics and statistics in  applied economic
analysis.   But  we  must  remember  that  in  economics  like  other  social  sciences,  data  are
nonexperimental.  Observations in economics are not repeatable in a controlled environment like in
physics, chemistry or biology.  So evidence per se are not conclusive.  As Stachurski (2016, p. 3)
states “our ability to generalize requires more than just data.  Ideally,  data are combined with a
theoretical model that encapsulates our knowledge of the system we are studying. Data can be used
to pin down parameter values for the model. If our model is good, then combining the model with
data  allows us  to  gain an  understanding of  how the  system works.”   We don't  know the  joint
distribution of our variables, we just have a sample, that is, we have partial information.  If we
represent a joint density as: gt(x t , x t−1 , x t−2, ... , x0∣θ), where the xs are outcomes indexed by time
and  θ is a vector of deep parameters (eg., preferences, technology, etc.),  then we either fix the
parameters θ and simulate the corresponding joint densities or observe the data (eg. one realization
of the xs) and infer the parameters (Sargent, 2016).  Therefore, for a stochastic process {g t}t=1∞ we
are forced either  to  have a  theoretical model  or to make assumptions if  we want to make any
meaningful generalization (Stachurski, 2016). 
The above fact poses a serious problem for economics as a science because a model based on
unreasonable or even false assumptions can be validated empirically.  The situation gets even worse
when  the  object  of  study  is  a  sensitive  issue  like  tax  policies,  wealth  concentration  or  debt
restructuring, where different parties may have opposite interests.  Additionally, the problem with
the selection of the sample opens the possibility of playing “cherry picking” to support a particular
policy position.   For example, thanks to analytical tools such as the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium  (DSGE)  models  that  we  discussed  earlier,  Alan  Greenspan,  the  Federal  Reserve
Chairman from 1987 to 2006 who opposed fiercely regulation of derivative markets, felt confident
in saying: "Regulation of derivatives transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is
unnecessary.  Regulation that serves no useful purpose hinders the efficiency of markets to enlarge
standards  of  living" (The  Washington  Post,  2008).  As  the  financial  crisis  of  2008  showed,
Greenspan's  free-market policy in the derivative market was a big mistake (Greenberger,  2010;
FCIC, 2011;  Grima,  2012;  Wilmarth,  2014; Whalen and Tan Bhala,  2011;  Mehrling,  2016 and
Webel,  2013).   Ironically,  the  parameters  of  the  DSGE  models  were  estimated  or  calibrated
empirically,  that  is  to  say,  with  real  world  data.   So,  thanks  to  this  fact,  the  unreasonable
assumptions of the model such as zero-economic profits and competitive markets in the financial
industry were validated with the supposed evidence – like a good scientific model is expected to
do.-  This was done in spite of all the signs perceived by the common people (including journalists),
which pointed exactly to the opposite direction (eg. Litterick, 2002; Anderson and Creswell, 2007
and Associated Press, 2006).   The little trick was to take into account only data from relatively
“normal” periods.  As Korinek (2017) observed: “Financial crisis are tail events that introduce a lot
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of skewness and fat tails into time series.  As a result, a good model of financial crises may well
distinguish itself by not matching the traditional second moments used to evaluate regular business
cycle models, which are driven by a different set of shocks.”  So the DSGE model, which was
supposed to be Lucas-critique (1976) consistent, it turned out to be like the old adage says “the cure
is worse than the disease”.
Another problem with statistics and the supposed empirical evidence in economics is the omission
of relevant facts and causal oversimplification.  Relevant to the Dominium Mundi Game, it is the
study conducted by De Long and Shleifer (1993).  They presented demographic and urbanistic data
of city growth encompassing the eight centuries prior to the Industrial Revolution.  As it was to be
expected,  both  the  collection  of  the  data  per  se and  the  statistical  analysis  were  rigorously
conducted.  However, the problem lies with the interpretation of the results. The authors seem to
suggest that merchant-controlled governments lead to high economic growth and prosperity while
prince or noble-controlled governments lead to low economic growth, stagnation and even the ruin
of a nation.  If the first part of that statement were true, then the DMG's First Conjecture would be
false.  Therefore, a clarification of this issue is absolutely necessary.  
Given our earlier discussion, we can say that De Long and Shleifer's (1993) bold claim is even
stronger than Adam Smith's invisible hand.  Adam Smith (1776) seemed to dislike the concentration
of political power in the hand of merchants.  He criticized the grant of monopolies, privileges and
special rights to merchants or trading companies (Smith, 1776).  So in order to support De Long and
Shleifer's (1993) claim, it would be necessary to collect far more information. First, we can not
exclude  from the  analysis  issues  like  unfair  enrichment,  which  encompasses  a  wide  variety  of
wrongful activities from deception, market manipulation, tax evasion, legal corruption, unjustified
profit,  odious  debt  and  treason  to  opium  trade,  piracy,  land  grabbing,  apartheid,  slavery,
environmental crime, war of aggression and profit-motivated genocide of native population.  With
unfair enrichment, it is perfectly possible to have islands of prosperity within a sea of misery.   And
of course, if we just sample the islands, the world will look like a paradise.  It is worth noting that
empirical evidences regarding unfair enrichment and other criminal activities -including clear  ius
cogens violations- were pervasive before and even during the industrial revolution, especially from
the cities that the authors seem to favor (Brion Davis, 2008; Kolchin, 1993; Hanes et al., 2004;
Shown Harjo et al., 2014; Mares, 2015; Greenberg, 2013; Dalrymple, 2015; Mann, 2009; Sakolski,
1932; Madley, 2017; Clark and Worger, 2011 and Jalata, 2013).  And as the Roman jurisprudence
has showed (Digest 50, 17, 29): Quod initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere,
which translates: “That which is void from the beginning cannot become valid by lapse of time”
(Black, 1910). 
Second, De Long and Shleifer (1993) give the impression that because of all the implications that
arise when a merchant elite effectively control the government, a merchant oligarchy or plutocracy
could  be  a  receipt  for  economic  success.   However,  here  again  we  need  more  information.
Regarding the true causes of innovation in Europe, Epstein's (2004, p. 382) observations are quite
revealing.  He stated that: “the view that premodern societies experienced low labor productivity
and stagnant living standards, and that technological change before ca. 1800 was close to zero due
to  pervasive  guild  rent-seeking  and poorly  specified  property  rights  to  knowledge  (Douglas  c.
North,  1981; Joel Mokyr, 2002), is hard to square with the fact that the surge of technological
innovation in the 18th century occurred within institutional frameworks not too dissimilar to those
of 1300.”  Khan and Sokoloff (2004, p. 399) confirm this statement when they affirmed that “a key
feature of the story [about the great inventors in the United Sates], however, is that much of the
population  possessed  some  familiarity  with  the  basic  elements  of  technology  during  this  era.
Moreover, apprenticeship or the widespread practice of leaving home during adolescence to pick up
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skills  in  a  trade…  was  both  widely  accessible  and  capable  of  adapting  to  many  of  the  new
developments and to the general quickening of the pace of advance over the 19th century.”   In
today's world,  Paul Romer's human capital  (1990) as a key driver of endogenous technological
change is even more important than before.  However, even De Long and Shleifer (1993) noted that
the merchant elite not only has “a very strong interest in rapid economic growth,” (p. 681) but also
seems to see taxation from the princes as a “monopoly on theft” (p. 679).  We assume that for the
greedy merchant elite, all princes are “absolutists” because greed by definition is boundless.  So it
doesn't seem reasonable to believe that a merchant oligarchy would invest enough resources on
human capital and on the well-being of the people.   In contrast, as we saw earlier, the DMG claims
that only the Law (or the fictitious Benevolent Social Planner) would allocate resources in a Pareto
consistent manner.
Third, in their arguments, De Long and Shleifer (1993) put a lot of emphasis on the security of
private property rights, which according to them is better protected with a merchant oligarchy than
with  a  prince.   However,  they  ignore  a  fundamental  fact,  the  inexorable  relationship  between
property right and sovereignty.  The canonical example is La Reconquista (“the reconquest”), where
the people from the Iberian Peninsula took almost 800 years to recover their lands and properties.
We cannot take peace and security for granted.  It is not reasonable to believe that without the popes
and the princes that support them the Western civilization could have survived (eg., the meeting
between Pope Leo and Attila in 452, the Battle of Poitiers in 732, the Battle of Cerami in 1063, the
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Battle of Vienna in 1683,
etc.).   It  is  also  worth  mentioning  that  who  bears  the  burden of  a  costly  war  is  usually  at  a
disadvantage.  In fact, many revolutions and civil wars have been triggered or at least have been
strongly influenced by the heavy taxes and other burdens that are imposed in the aftermath of a war
(eg., the Dutch Revolt after Philip II of Spain´s wars, the American and French Revolution after the
Seven Years’ War, the Bolsheviks and Nazi Revolution after World War I).  Additionally, De Long
and Shleifer (1993) didn't provide any concrete evidence that could give rise to the claim that the
“rule of law” in general and that the protection of property rights acquired trough lawful activities in
particular were stronger in merchant-controlled governments than in the European states with long-
standing jurisprudential  tradition  such as  Spain  before  the  industrial  revolution  and the  former
Pontifical states.  
The take-home message here is that to draw conclusions from “some” statistical evidence about a
very complex social problem could be misleading.  In this work, we will not try to validate the
Dominium Mundi Game (DMG) empirically as if it were the best representation of the world.  The
problem with the DMG is that it is a greedy-based theory whose applicability depends on whether
society is organized by greed or not.  Before the rise of Constantine I in 324 AD, it would have been
reasonable to assume that greed was the guiding principle for organizing civilization.  But in the 4 th
century AD, after the Diocletianic persecution,  it  seems that  the world experienced a profound
moral revolution, which was able not only to defeat some of the world's most powerful men, but
also to lay the foundations of a relatively moral civilization without precedent in human history
-although far from perfect.-  The origin of such a sustainable moral force can be traced back to the
highlands of Southern Levant with the figure of the Prophet Elias (Elijah), who lived in the 9 th
century  BC (wikipedia,  2018).   He seems to  be  the  first  to  establish  in  a  very  clear  way the
irreconcilable nature between greed and a truly moral religion (eg. 1 Kings 18:21).  It seems that
before him it was a common practice to embrace and even to mix two opposite systems of beliefs;
in other words, religion corruption was widely tolerated.    
Today's world is much more complex.  Greed coexists and interacts with moral forces in such a way
that it is beyond the scope of this work to try to figure out its dynamics, let alone to predict its
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outcomes.   Additionally, we recognize the theoretical limitations of the DMG framework to explain
endogenously -withing the  model-  the emergence  of  a  sustainable  moral  force.   That  probably
would belong to the realm of theology.   Instead, we take a pragmatic approach and assume that
today's world lies somewhere between two extremes.  On one extreme we have Victoria's visible
hand (a competitive equilibrium or its extensions consistent with the rule of Law as we saw earlier)
and on the other extreme we have the Dominium Mundi Game (which also includes Adam Smith's
invisible hand).  Thus, the key question to ask would be if the DMG framework is still relevant
given the state of today´s world.   In other words,  we would like to know if  greed still  has an
influence in the affairs of the world.   If greed were a key or dominant force in today's world, then
the Dominium Mundi Game could be considered a very crude approximation of how we organize
society and, therefore, its normative implications, as suggested by the DMG´s conjectures, should
be taken seriously.
Given the DMG's Fundamental Inequality, the most obvious indicator to assess the relevance of our
framework  would  be  the  world's  wealth  distribution.   Extreme wealth  concentration  would  be
consistent with the DMG.  According to the Credit Suisse's Global Wealth Report of 2018 (see
Shorrocks, et al.,  2018), while 64% of the world adult population owns just 1,9% of the global
wealth, the 0.8% of the world adult population possesses 45% of the world's wealth. In addition, the
Credit Suisse's report states that there are not only 5.1 million adults with wealth above USD 5
million, but also 4,390 individuals with net worth above USD 500 million.  Forbes (2017) goes
even further, documenting the existence of 1,810 individuals, whose average net worth is around
USD 3.6 billions.  Together,  these  billionaires  possess  an  incredible  wealth  of  USD 6.5 trillion
(Forbes, 2017), which might be around the total wealth of two third of the world population (see
Shorrocks, et al., 2017). In fact, Oxfam (2017) asseverates that only 8 men own as much wealth as
half of humanity.  According to the World Inequality Report of 2018 (see Alvaredo et al., 2018), the
wealth inequality in the United Stated has risen sharply.  The report observes: “...where the top 1%
wealth share rose from 22% in 1980 to 39% in 2014.  Most of that increase in inequality was due to
the rise of the top 0.1% wealth owners.” Regarding the world's rising global inequality, this report
forecast that: “The continuation of past wealth-inequality trends will see the wealth share of the top
0.1% global wealth owners (in a world represented by China, the EU, and the United States) catch
up with the share of the global wealth middle class by 2050.”  The evidence presented above, which
may underestimate the true global inequality as the Panama and Paradise papers suggest,  is fully
consistent  with  the  Dominium  Mundi Game  and  it  is  against  the  claim  of  a  global  economy
characterized  by  competitive  equilibrium,  zero-economic  profit  conditions  and  perfect
governments.
Given a world with extreme wealth concentration, the next question to be asked is how is the “state”
of the world regarding the lives of people, the environment and the international legal order.  The
predictions of the Dominium Mundi Game, as suggested by its First Conjecture, is that greed has a
very negative impact on global welfare.  According to Nasa (2018), the evidence of rapid climate
change is compelling from global temperature rise, warming oceans, shrinking ice sheets, glacial
retreat to decreased snow cover, sea level rise, declining Arctic sea ice, extreme events and ocean
acidification.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2018) states that a rise of
temperature above 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels will cause an irreversible damage on the
planet.  Figure 4a already shows a rise of temperature of 1.27° during the 1913-2007 period.  That
means that the rapid economic growth from the last century has been unsustainable, that is to say, at
the expense of the environment and future generations.  Our global economy needs urgently to
make a transition to become a low-carbon economy.  A report released in October 2018 by the IPCC
reveals  (p.  2)  that  “limiting  global  warming  to  1.5°C  would  require  “rapid  and  far-reaching”
transitions  in  land,  energy,  industry,  buildings,  transport,  and  cities.  Global  net  human-caused
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emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) would need to fall by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by
2030, reaching ‘net zero’ around 2050. This means that any remaining emissions would need to be
balanced by removing CO2 from the air.”   But regarding the reliance on techniques that remove
CO2 from the air,  this  report  also makes clear  that  “The effectiveness of such techniques are
unproven at large scale and some may carry significant risks for sustainable development.”  In spite
of the overwhelming evidence on climate change and its catastrophic economic impact, the United
States decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement of 2015 on climate change mitigation.  This
fact is another confirmation of the empirical relevance of the  Dominium Mundi Game, especially
when  compared  with  conventional  models  found  in  the  economic  literature  based  on  rational
expectation  or  even bounded rationality  (man-made  climate  change is  a  well-known fact  even
confirmed by a major US government report released on November 23, 2018).  
Figure 4. The State of the World's KPIs
Note*   :The red slice of the Global Warming chart, which covers the period 1913-2017, illustrates the 
  total absolute change in the earth's surface temperature relative to 1951-1980 average 
  temperatures using NASA's lowess smoothing estimates. On the other hand, the blue slice shows the
  difference between the 2 degrees Celsius criterion established by the Paris Agreement and the 
  above rise in temperature since 1913. 
Note**   :This figure means that six out of seven people in the world live in an underdeveloped country. 
Note***     :ICJ and ICC are the abbreviations for the International Court of Justice and the International 
  Criminal Court respectively. P5-UNSC is the abbreviation for the five permanent members of the 
  United Nations' Security Council. 
Data source:   NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, The CIA World Factbook (2018), 
  International Criminal Court, United Nations Treaty Collections. 
Figure 4b reveals that economic development has been only the privilege of 1/7 (or 14.3%) of the
world population.  In other words, 6 out 7 people in the world live in an underdeveloped country.
Economic  development  is  in  today's  world  a  very  exclusive  club,  whose  impact  goes  beyond
material well-being to affect significantly vital statistics such as health and life expectancy as Figure
5 implies.  Finally, Figure 4c shows that the overwhelming majority of the most powerful nations of
the world are not interested in the rule of law.  As the Roman Jurist Celsus stated: “The Law is a
coherent system and presupposes its order is complete” (Digest, Book IX).  That means that no one
can be above or outside the Law because otherwise there is no Law -the primary aim of the Law is
to protect the weak against the abuse by the strong (Ayala, 1789, p.6).  These powerful nations
pursue  their  own self  interests  as  it  was  accepted  in  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  of  1648.   This
unfortunate situation opens the doors not only to more subtle forms of unfair enrichment as exposed
by the Panama and Paradise papers but also to wars of aggression (eg., the annexation of Crimea by
Russia in 2014) and proxy wars (eg., Nicaragua v. United States, see ICJ,  1986)   Again, all these
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facts mentioned above are fully consistent with the DMG.   Thus, according to Figure 4, the world
seems to be upside down. 
Figure 5.  Countries by Life Expectancy at Birth v. GDP per Capita (PPP)
Note   :The size of the bubble is scaled in different categories in order to represent the size of the 
  country's population. The bigger the size of the bubble, the bigger the population of the respective 
  country. On one extreme, blue bubbles represent developed countries and, on the other extreme, red 
    bubbles represent the least developed nations. All the country classifications presented here are        
  based exclusively on the displayed two variables. This chart doesn't include the following two group
  of countries: 1) Qatar, Macau, Luxembourg, Singapore, Brunei, Montenegro, South Sudan, Kosovo,
  Somalia, Swaziland and Gaza Strip 2) all other countries or territories with a population less than 
         285,000. PPP means purchasing power parity.
Data source:   The CIA World Factbook (2018). 
So what can we do to change this situation?  Here is where the Dominium Mundi Game framework
shines above everything else.   Given that the DMG is built  on primitives such as  self-interest,
human fallibility and human sociability, “the solution lies within the problem.”  With some didactic
exaggeration from our side, the simple, straightforward solution to the word´s problems would be to
get rid of greed and the world would work like a Swiss watch in a very predictable fashion as the
old-generation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models would have suggested.  This
was showed in the previous section when we replaced W (⋯) with W˚ (⋯) to obtain a rational
expectation model.  But this is not a new idea.  In fact, to consider greed as the root of all kinds of
evils (1 Tim. 6:10) was the traditional wisdom expressed by jurists and religious leaders until the
apology of Adam Smith's invisible hand took off.   The Roman jurist Ulpian suggested what a social
order  without  greed  could  imply  when  he  stated:  “Iuris  praecepta  sunt  haec:  honeste  vivere,
alterum non  laedere,  suum cuique  tribuere,”  (Digest  1.1.10.1),  which  translates  as  “The  basic
principles of law are: to live honestly, not to harm anyone, to give each his due.”  When we apply
the DMG framework to normative aims, the little trick is not to assume competitive equilibrium and
zero-economic profits as the DSGE did for the trading sector, but instead we must impose these
conditions to the market through a rational application of the Law, taking into account the market's
powerful incentive structures (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Hart, 1983; Stiglitz, 1983; Wang
and Williamson, 1996 and Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012).  In other words, we need to go from
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Adam Smith's invisible hand to Francisco de Vitoria's visible hand as discussed in Section 1.  The
Second Conjecture of the DMG expresses the above statement. 
Second Conjecture: Given the DMG' Fundamental  Inequality  Δ(v(x),x)>0, ∀ x and its  First
Conjecture, it is sufficient to ban irrevocably unfair enrichment in all its manifestations and subtle
forms in order to prevent the development of man-made adverse shocks.  
Unfair enrichment is such a powerful legal concept, which brings to life Celsus' words, “scire leges
non  hoc  est  verba  earum  tenere,  sed  vim  and  potestatem (Digest.  1.3.17)”,  which  means
understanding the laws does not mean simply knowing the words, but their force and scope.  Unfair
enrichment is the jurisprudential way to deal with the problem of greed. Its formation as a principle
of Law can be traced back to the Roman civil law (ius civile) and its essence can be summarized in
the following maxim “nemo locupletari debet cum aliena iactura,” which translates “no one should
be benefited at  another's  expense”.  The above maxim,  derived from the  work of  Roman jurist
Sextus Pomponius (Pomponius, Digest 12.6.14), is equivalent to the economic concept of Pareto
optimality, which can be summarized as: “an allocation in which no one can be made better-off
without someone else becoming worse-off” (Simon and Blume, 1994. p. 565). However, unlike
competitive equilibria, whose benefits depend on the well-functioning of the market or the absence
of externalities, increasing returns, distorting taxes, etc., unfair enrichment is beyond any market
arrangement or failure.  Its full power comes from a proper understanding of the Law. The key
jurisprudential criterion for unfair enrichment is the absence of basis or lack of explanatory basis
(causa iuris). 
In order to grasp the full meaning of unfair enrichment and its implications in economics, we must
make first some clarifications given Andrei Shleifer's (2004) opinions articulated in his paper: Does
Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior? He brings a notion of competitive equilibrium that it has
nothing to  do with  Pareto  optimality,  and therefore,  it  poses  a  challenge  to  the  jurisprudential
concept of unfair enrichment, which should be equivalent to Pareto Optimum.  Shleifer (2004, p.
415 and p.  417) stated the following remarks:  “When a firm's competitor  can reduce his taxes
through corruption, or can import by paying lower bribes rather than higher tariffs, he can pass on
his savings to consumers. In a competitive market, then, every firm must itself pay bribes or go out
of  business.”   He  continues  saying:  “Corruption  may  enable  small  business  to  get  around
unreasonable regulations, and actually encourage economic development. Child labor may improve
the  economic  circumstances  of  both  children  and  their  families  in  places  where  the  feasible
alternative are hunger and malnutrition.”  It seems that Shleifer's cases refer to the phenomenon of
competition  with  externalities  -where  private  and social  estimations  are  not  the  same.   In  that
situation, the classical connection between Pareto optima and competitive equilibria is broken down
(Stokey and Lucas with Prescott, 1989).  They are no longer equivalent terms.  No one can be made
better-off without someone else becoming worse-off.   Can we justify a wrongful or criminal act
like slavery or child sexual exploitation on the basis  that the supposed feasible alternatives are
worse or that it will promote economic growth? The jurisprudential answer would be an absolute
no.  As we already mentioned, the Law is a coherent system and presupposes its order is complete.
For the case of corruption and child labor brought by Shleifer, we can not simply analyze both
wrongful behavior in isolation and conclude that they are justified without taking into consideration
the full impact of each of these wrongful acts in the entire legal order.  Additionally, With child
labor there can be no Romer's (1990) human capital?  Even it may be the case that corruption and
child labor are related as common sense would suggest.  Maybe there is a vicious circle in which
corruption  causes  poverty  and  poverty  generates  child  labor,  which  in  turn,  produces  more
corruption and poverty and so on.   Additionally,  as we saw in Section 1,  Francisco de Vitoria,
following the reasoning of the Roman jurists, would not even consider Shleifer's cases of wrongful
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behavior as competitive equilibrium because they are simply not lawful; that is to say, those cases
can not be part of any lawful transaction between two parties. In case of unreasonable regulations or
anticipated human misery, the Law shall provide the necessary adjustments and remedies and not
leave the solution to traffickers of human dignity.
Intangible assets also pose some challenges to the concept of unfair enrichment.   As we saw above,
the Law is a coherent system and presupposes its order is complete. Intellectual property law can
not contradict  the law of unfair  enrichment because both seek the common good.  In fact,  the
primary purpose of the Law has always been to protect the weak against the abuse by the strong
(Ayala, 1789, p.6). One of the reason for the extraordinary success of US patent law was, according
to Khan and Sokoloff (2004, p. 395), to “break from Old World precedent in reserving the right to a
patent to “the first and true” inventor anywhere in the world, as opposed to his employer or to the
first to import the technology into the respective country...”. Intellectual property (IP) laws were
enacted to provide incentives for the creation of technological progress, not to enrich the inventor or
his/her assignee, or to privatize public domain knowledge (see Mazzucato, 2013). Because of this
reason, an IP right has a term, a maximum period for its validity, where it is to be expected that the
holder of that right can recover all of his costs and be fairly compensated for the risk taken. This
means that  intellectual property laws, in  principle,  must be consistent with Pareto Optima,  and
therefore,  with unfair  enrichment.  So the key take-home message here is  that  the market  shall
provide only the necessary incentives for a productive economic activity (eg., work, investment,
innovation, etc.) to take place in a timely and efficient manner.  That means that all enrichment
processes need to be justified; they must have a cause, an  explanatory basis consistent with both
economics and the Law (ius); they must be for the common good.  The Law with all its powerful
legal remedies at its disposal must ensure that this will be the case.
The problem with the extreme wealth concentration observed in today's world is that the share of
the wealth captured by those individuals at the very top are unreasonable and far disproportionate
with respect to their  own contributions or the necessary incentives that the market should have
provided.   How much can  claim somebody who worked 66 hours  per  week,  or  invested  their
relative limited savings in a business venture?   What is the fair rate of return given a determined
risk profile (see Damodaran, 2012)?  Can a tiny group of people be entitled to own half of the world
because of some kind of “divine right” as the moral philosopher Adam Smith suggested (1759)?
Those fabulous wealth are unfair enrichment beyond any reasonable doubt.  There are no reasons or
causes neither in economics nor the Law that can justify such a high level of wealth concentration.
As the words attributed to the Roman jurist Papinian suggest (Nasmith, 1890, p. 99), “It is easier to
commit than to justify a parricide.”   Paradoxically, the world's legal orders have not only tolerated
but also protected extreme wealth concentration that clearly goes against the Law.  This fact is also
consistent with the  Dominium Mundi Game.  Economics, as a social science concerned with the
study  of  the  production,  distribution  and  consumption  of  goods  and  service,  is  not  only  well
positioned to  provide a rigorous analysis  on that  issue,  but also to  take advantage of the legal
remedies  brought  by  the  jurisprudence  of  unfair  enrichment  in  order  to  correct  the  main
dysfunctionalities observed in the market.  This is especially important in a world where “financial
accumulation implies ever-increasing wealth inequality” (Biondi and Olla, 2018, p. 1.  See also
Piketty, 2013).  
The  current  economic  literature  seems  to  offer  neither  a  theoretical  nor  a  practical  solution.
Mainstream economics suggests that the optimal tax for capital must be zero (Ordover and Phelps,
1979; Chamley, 1986; Judd, 2002 and Mankiw, et. al., 2009).  In a very clear way, Mankiw et. al.,
(2009, p. 21) provides the justification for the above statement: “the logic for low capital  taxes is
powerful: the supply of capital is highly elastic, capital taxes yield large distortions to intertemporal
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consumption  plans  and discourage saving,  and capital  accumulation is  central  to  the aggregate
output of the economy.”  Additionally,  given the prevalence of offshore banking, tax havens, lax
international tax laws and recent tax cuts to the rich (eg. Trump tax cuts), it seems that in matters of
taxation the world is heading to a race to the bottom.  Nevertheless, as Nicholas Kaldor (1963)
suggested, the world needs resources in order to solve its problems -something cannot come out of
nothing-.   Restitution, the legal remedy devised by the Roman jurists to treat the problem of unfair
enrichment, can indeed accomplish the task that taxation seems unable or unwilling to do.  Given
the  DMG's  Fundamental  Inequality  and  the  statistics  provided  earlier  on  extreme  wealth
concentration, humanity can apply restitution to recover trillions of dollars of unfair enrichment
(including  unjustified  wealth).   This  massive  amount  of  resources  can  be  used  in  the  most
expeditious way not only to solve the world's most urgent problems such as poverty and climate
change but also to invest in the future of mankind, educating humanity and providing funds to
finance  all  the necessary research and development  (R&D) that  the market  will  never  offer  in
equilibrium (Romer, 1990).  Only then, we can really talk about the rule of law, that is to say, about
a world ruled by the Law.  Francisco de Vitoria's (1539)  communitas totius orbis  (international
community)  and  its  corresponding  universal  common  good  would  be  finally  meaningful.
Otherwise, the disgraceful alternative to humanity will be the self-destructive  Dominium Mundi
Game.
In a world where greed plays a key role as a way to organize society, an obvious question would be
how to bring about the Second Conjecture of the  Dominium Mundi Game.   As we saw earlier,
greed  has  proved throughout  history  to  be  such a  resilient  and even unbeatable  force,  able  to
penetrate even religious and legal institutions and to corrupt them from the inside out.   Greed, the
ruthless maximization of self-interest, is basically a merciless and amoral force.  It lacks any moral
consideration with the rightness or wrongness of something.  So it is reasonable to assume that any
serious opposition to greed will be fiercely resisted as the most influential sacred texts have showed
with innumerable examples.  The triumph of the Law will only come as a result of a deliberate and
decisive endeavor (Ulpian, Digest 1.1.10pr); thus, the problem of defeating greed is in essence a
moral  choice.   Humanity,  who has  free will,  must consciously decide and the forces  of nature
-including human nature- will act accordingly.
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